

Well-being of Migrant Children and Youth in Europe

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List of Abbreviations

AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
BREAD	Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe Countries
CEPR	Centre for Economic Policy Research
CET	Countries with Economics in Transition
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPRC	Chronic Poverty Research Centre
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DRC	Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty
ECHP	European Community Household Panel
EICM	European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSOEP	German Socio Economic Panel
HBSC	Health Behavior in School-Aged Children
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HWWA	Hamburg Institute of International Economics
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ICSEY	International Comparative Studies of Ethnocultural Youth
IDS	Institute of Developing Studies
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fond
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IZA	Institute for the Study of Labor
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LFS	Labour Force Survey
LSMS	Living Standard Measurement Survey
LWAS	Luxembourg Wealth Study
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPHI	Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative
PIRLS	Progress in International Reading and Literacy Study
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment
SILC	EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
TIES	The Integration of the European Second Generation
TIMMS	Third International Mathematics and Science Study

TSER	Targeted Socio Economic Research
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WHOQOL	World Health Organization Quality of Life Instruments
WIDER	World Institute for Development Economics Research

1. Introduction and Overview

International migration affects development and development affects international migration. Today, Europe is characterized by a wide and complex pattern of movements of high skilled but also of low skilled workers. While in the past many European countries focused on controlling and reducing migration, more recently migration policies aim to influence the pattern of migration while acknowledging the reality and in fact the need for immigration. This also occurred in view of the ‘demographic divide’ (Kent and Haub 2005), i.e. the vast gap in birth and death rates between developing and developed countries, where the question arises for many Western European countries how they can attenuate the imminent shortage of labor supply and prevent the collapse of social security systems through appropriate migration policies. Within sending countries there is a problematic imbalance between labor supply and labor demand and within receiving countries low birth rates and aging societies leading to shortage of labor supply and pension payers in the medium term. Capital intensive technologies in receiving countries provide plenty opportunities for highly educated and highly skilled workers while, on the other hand, opportunities for low skilled workers are shrinking, particularly in traditional manufacturing industries; there remain opportunities, however, in the service sector. This also determines the opportunities for first-generation immigrants, depending on their skills, educational background, and language proficiencies. For the next generation, i.e. for children of these immigrants as well as their children, the contribution they can make and the opportunities they face will depend largely on the way the host countries are promoting their economic, educational and social opportunities. Thus from a perspective of the host country, the economic and social well-being of migrant children is of critical importance. Promoting opportunities of migrant children is clearly promoting the long-term economic and development of OECD countries; the question is whether and how host countries are planning to capitalize on these opportunities.

But there is of course another perspective which is to concentrate on the well-being of migrants and their children themselves. The well-being of migrants affects not only their ability to send remittances to their home country but also to acquire skills and knowledge, which will be either useful if they choose to return to the country of origin or settle permanently in the host country. Among those who settle permanently (which constitute the vast majority of immigrants), the second generation of migrants comprise an increasing share of children in the youth in Western European countries but only very little is known about the status of well-being of this particular group.

The effects of migration on development and (and the impact of development on migration) has attracted increasing attention both for developing countries and developed countries. However, whereas the regulation and management of migration has received

considerable attention by policy makers in recent years, the question of the opportunities to capitalize on migration with a special focus on the role of children and young adults has often been neglected. But especially children and the youth are very important for the future development of both receiving and sending countries. Children and the youth play very important roles in international migration because they comprise a large share of all migrants. Children and the youth affected by migration are the group that is most vulnerable to risks resulting from the movement. Children and the youth are affected when they left behind by one or both parents, when migrating with the family or when moving alone and the effects of international migration children and the youth form a wide and complex system of transmission channels. Thus the well-being of migrant children and youth is both of intrinsic importance as their well-being is strongly affected by migration, but also of instrumental importance about the contribution they can make to both sending and receiving countries.

The literature has only highlighted some aspects of the experience of migrant children and youth. Some authors emphasize the importance of migrant children and the youth with respect to their potential as agents of social and economic changes (Carey and Kim, 2006; Roudi-Fahimi and Kent, 2007). And although the 2005 report of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) refers to children, the report does not take into account the youth. Furthermore, although the 2007 World Development Report focuses on the youth, it only takes into the question of the role of young migrant as stakeholders for the economic development in the long run but it bypassed the question of how migration affects the well-being of children neither of the first nor the second generation. Only few attempts exists in the literature so far, which try to assess the impact of migration on the vulnerability of children and the youth to sexual exploitation, trafficking, child soldiers and child labor (Whitehead and Hashim, 2005; Carey and Kim, 2006; Zimmermann, 2003). Thus, little is known about the channels through which migration affects the well-being of children and the youth. Studies are especially rare for developed countries. Only very few studies on well-being of migrant children and the youth in developed countries. Exceptions are the studies undertaken by The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) and by the International Comparative Studies of Ethnocultural Youth (ICSYE) that analyze the well-being of the second generation children of immigrants in developed countries. Similarly, there are individual pieces of evidence pointing to disadvantages of migrant children in some dimensions of well-being. For example, differences exist in the level of education between children and the youth with migration background and their native counterparts in many OECD countries, which may have severe negative socioeconomic consequences in the long run. These differences in education are probably the most studied aspect of the well-being of migrant children, also aided by the plethora of new surveys on enrolments and educational achievement.

The scarcity of research on the impact of migration on well-being (other than educational performance) also reflects the very limited availability of data to study these issues. Another reason is that studies of well-being and migration are not linked very closely. Much attention has been paid to the well-being of children and its link to development; similarly, there is a large literature on linking migration and development but linking these two literatures by focusing on the well-being of migrant children is rare.

The aim of the paper is to make children and the youth visible in the discourse of migration and well-being in order to emphasize the importance of migrant children and migrant youth as important stakeholders for future social economic development both in receiving and sending countries. The paper provides a synopsis about existing studies on migrant children and migrant youth in Europe. In addition, it provides a conceptual framework to analyze well-being of migrant children and youth in their many dimensions. To increase the participation of children and young adults in the social, economic and political dimensions, to facilitate their transition to adulthood and to avoid exclusion and decrease vulnerability remain one of the major goals for many countries in order to enhance and insure sustainable human and social capital of migrants and promote their contribution to society. Therefore, the development of an analytical framework to monitor the multidimensional well-being of migrant children and migrant youth is of crucial importance to deal with the question in which ways migration as well as host country conditions, processes, and policies facilitates or hinders the development of capabilities of young people affected by migration. Thus it is important to emphasize that this paper largely primarily takes the perspective of the migrant children and youth as the central focus of analysis while also commenting on the impact this can have on sending and receiving countries. Given the survey nature of this paper, we will only be able to selectively address the many issues that relate to the well-being of migrant children.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a conceptual framework of migration with a focus of migrant children and the youth. This section provides a definition of migration and provides an overview of theories and determinants of migration. In addition, Section 2 describes the European migration system and shows recent trend in migration within this region. In Section 3, the conceptual framework for the assessment of the well-being of migrant children and the youth is developed based on the large literature on well-being concepts and their measurement. Section 4 discusses related measurement issues and provides a description of data sources that can be used to assess the well-being of migrant children and the youth. Finally, Section 5 concludes by proposing a research agenda on the well-being of migrant children.

2. Determinants and Effects of Migration

2.1 Definition of Migration

Analyzing and understanding how migration affects the well-being of children and youth requires both the specifying how children are affected by migration and the identification the dimensions of human well-being that are affected. In this section, we start with defining international migration and categorizing how children and the youth are affected by migration.

International migrants are persons who take up residence in a foreign country.¹ This definition of international migration includes those foreigners who remain in a new country for an extended time period. Thus, by this definition, tourists, business travelers, religious pilgrims, etc. are not considered as international migrants (IOM 2000).

The 2000 report of the International Organization on Migration (IOM) provides a useful categorization of migrants, which can be summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Types of International Migration

Voluntary migrants	Forced migrants
Labour migrants	Refugees
Family reunification	Asylum seekers
Foreign students	Displaced persons
Illegal (irregular) migrants	Environmental migrants
	<i>Trafficking</i>
	<i>Human smuggling</i>

Source: Based on the categorization of international migrants proposed by the the 2000 World Migration Report (IOM 1999, 2000); illustration by the authors.

There are several ways in which migration can be categorized. One is to distinguish between voluntary migrants and forced migrants. Voluntary migrants are people who move in another country for purposes of, for example, employment, study, and family reunification.² Forced migrants move abroad to, for example, escape persecution, conflict, repression, and natural disasters. While conceptually clear, distinguishing between the two types of migrants in practice is not an easy task. For example, voluntary migrants may also be forced to migrate to find a job. Forced migrants may choose a particular country to move to because of family reunification or favorable economic conditions in that country (Sesay, 2004). In addition, one form of migration often leads to another form of migration. For instance, forced migrants might bring their family after a while and voluntary might have to move back to their home country in order to prevent their repatriation (IOM 2000).

¹ This definition of migration is consistent with the definition of the United Nations (United Nations 1995). In contrast to internal migration, e.g. rural-urban migration, international migration means that people move across state borders. In this paper we do not consider movements within countries, i.e. from urban to rural areas or vice versa.

² Migrants entering a country with the aim of family unification are more likely to be women than men.

Illegal/irregular or undocumented migrants, while often voluntary, typically do also not have access to the formal labor market. Many illegal migrants, therefore, work in the informal sector. Thus they live in a kind of double illegality. As a result, illegal migrants are most vulnerable to trafficking and human smuggling because they have no means to fend against low wages and arbitrary treatment.³ In particular, women migrating illegally face a very high risk of being forced to prostitution. In this paper we will not focus primarily on the well-being issues of forced migrants as the issues here are quite distinct and are covered quite well in a literature on this issue. Thus our focus will be on voluntary migrants and their well-being during the migration process and in the host country.

When defining international migration, the time dimension of movement also plays an important role. Thus, in addition to the above categorization, the IOM further takes into account the time span migrants move abroad and distinguish between *traditional permanent migration*, *long-term migration* and *short term labor migration* (e.g. seasonal work, cross-border commuting) (IOM 1999). With respect to the impact of migration on families and in particular on children and on youth, both whether moving with the parent or left behind, traditional permanent migration and long-term migration are expected to have a much higher impact than cross-border commuting, and we will largely neglect commuting in the rest of this paper. Closely related to this distinction is another form of international migration, which is sometimes called ‘transnational migration’. Transnational migration is characterized by cross-border networks of migrants to their home countries through frequent visits and communication and the transfer of remittances. This means, that migrants permanently circulate between home and destination country; to this extent children are affected by this, we will consider them below as well.

Although many different definitions of children and the youth exist⁴, in this paper, for simplicity, children and the youth are defined as individuals aged between 0 and 18 years.⁵ Children and young adults are affected by migration in different ways depending on the migration process. This is summarized in Table 2.

³ In many countries the employment of illegal workers is a growing market, because it is very attractive for employers to save high wage and non-wage labor costs.

⁴ For example, the United Nations defines children as individuals aged between 5 and 15 and youth as individuals aged between 16 and 24. The Convention on the rights of the children defines children as individuals under the age of 18. In the World Development Report 2007, ‘young people’ are defined as persons aged between 12 and 24. The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) distinguish between infant (0), children (1-14) and youth (15-24).

⁵ In this paper the terms ‘youth’, ‘young adults’ and ‘adolescents’ are used as similar terms.

Table 2: Children and youth affected by migration

Dependent migration	Migrating with parents	Born home Born abroad
Independent migration	Migrating alone	Voluntarily Fostered (e.g. for education)
	Left behind	Father migrates Mother migrates Both parents migrate
Forced migration	Alone or with family members	Trafficking Human Smuggling Refugees
Second Generation Migrants	Born in the host country	Citizenship of the host country Citizenship of the home country

Source: Illustration by the authors.

The core distinctions for the types of international child migration are between dependent and independent migration and between forced and voluntary migration. These distinctions are important because they have direct implications for the vulnerability of young migrants to different risks that can affect the well-being. First, children and the youth might accompany their parents when moving abroad; this migration process will directly affect their well-being with the impact also depending on their age. Second, they might have migrated independently of their parents, either in a process of fostering (for example, for educational purposes) or voluntarily as labor migrants (or as those who ran away from home and might end up as street children). These children will face very different issues to those who migrated with their parents as they have left their family as the most important social network.⁶ In general, they are likely to be more vulnerable.

Third, they can indirectly affected by migration in two ways. They can be left behind, which, as we discuss below, have different impact on the children and the youth depending on who of the family moves away, the father, the mother or even both parents in which case the left behind have to live with other relatives or friends. But they can also be the children of migrating parents, which are sometimes referred to as children with a migration background. Depending on the roles governing immigration and citizenship, there second-generation migrants might have the citizenship of the host country or of the country of origin of the parents (or sometimes both).

As discussed above, these forms of migration are different from forced migration, i.e. trafficking or human smuggling because children who move alone or with their parents act as agents based on their own decisions (or at least these of the family), whereas forced migration is based on the decision of other individuals or groups.

⁶ In the case of children running away from home, of course, that social network has probably been dysfunctional.

2.2 Migration Theory

Empirically, the two main determinants driving migration are the real wage gaps between sending and receiving countries and the demographic differentials between the sending and receiving countries. Examining the size, causes and future of international migration within and out of Africa, Hatton and Williamson (2003) argue that the slow economic growth, combined by a rapid growth of the cohort of potential young migrants in many African countries, will increase the pressure of emigration out of Africa into the OECD countries considerably in the next two decades.⁷

While such results crudely explain overall migration flows, the growing complexity of international migration during the last decades has revealed that such macro level approaches cannot well identify particular migrant groups and their rather complex set of motivations. Migrants, especially young people, do not simply respond to wage and employment differentials and, moreover, they are not homogenous with respect to their motivation to migrate. Thus, to explain recent international migration necessitates more complex and differentiated theoretical approaches, which emphasize migrants as active agents and which combine micro-level and macro-level approaches. The interaction of individual motivations and environmental circumstances at the household, community and national level have become fundamental to analyze and understand the contemporary migration flows. Based on the idea of push and pull factors that determine migration decisions formulated by Lee (1966)⁸, four main theories exist that try to explain the complex and global phenomena of international migration caused by decisions at the micro-level and macro-level circumstances, namely *neoclassical economic theory*, the *new economics of migration*, the *segmented labor market theory*, and the *World systems theory*.

The *neoclassical economic theory* of migration (see, e.g. Lewis, 1954; Sjaastad, 1969; Todaro 1969, Harris and Todaro, 1970) conceives migration in terms of push and pull factors and focuses on the differences in wages and employment conditions between countries. Strong empirical evidence exists that migration increases with the gap in earnings between sending and receiving countries. The lack in economic development contributes to migration pressure and the decision of migration is an individual decision for income maximization. Unemployment, low real wages, poor workings conditions, and absence of future economic opportunities motivate individuals to migrate towards

⁷ For example, Holzmann (2005) estimates for Europe, Russia and high income countries in East Asia and the Pacific that, without further migration, the labor force would decrease by 43 million between 2005 and 2025. For Sub-Saharan Africa Holzmann (2005) estimates an increase by 2111 million and for South and East Asia an increase by 292 million.

⁸ In particular, Lee (1966) argues that certain variables, like distance, physical and political barriers and having dependents can impede or even prevent migration.

countries with better opportunities. The higher the expected wage in the destination country and the higher the unemployment in the country of origin, the higher the propensity to migrate. In this view, young adults are (or even youth) are particularly likely to migrate. The classic argument why the youth are more likely to migrate is that migration is an investment, requiring costs today to generate higher return from higher income in the future (Sjaastad 1969). The costs of migration include, for example, the cost of moving, finding a job, and the mental costs of leaving the family. The potential higher return depends on the wage, the probability of finding a job, and the length of time learning and working in abroad. Young people have both higher lifetime returns and lower costs of moving. An important extension of this view is to examine which population groups will be particularly prone to migration. For that it is important to consider differential returns to skills between sending and receiving country, which is closely related to differential inequality between two countries (Borjas, 1990). If inequality is lower in the sending than in the receiving countries (and this inequality is largely driven by returns to skills), then highly-skilled are particularly prone to migration; in the reverse case, low skilled migrants are more likely to migrate.

In contrast to the neoclassical theory, the *new economics of migration* focuses on the household or the family as the relevant decision making unit rather than on the individual. These views also more explicitly take note of migration costs and how they affect migrant flows. Although migration is clearly related to differentials in wages and employment, the differences cannot explain international movements alone. Economic disparities are rather a necessary but not a sufficient requirement for international migration. The new economics of migration (see, e.g. Stark and Bloom, 1985; Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark, 1991) takes into account various market conditions and does not focus only on the labor market. Behaviors and attitudes of potential migrants are not only based on decisions at the individual level but also at the level of groups. Migration is a decision of the household, not only with the aim to maximize individual income but with the aim to minimize risks to family income or to overcome constraints on family production or consumption attributable to failures in insurance, capital, or credit markets.⁹ Households are in a better position to control risks to their socio-economic well-being than individuals by diversifying the allocation of the family labor force. Households can send one member abroad to count on remittances, which helps them to cope with risks and shocks. Exporting labor in return for remittances constitutes an important development strategy. Remittances not only serve as a way to diversify earning opportunities and to reduce risks and the micro-level, at the macro-level remittances is has become an important source of external

⁹ Thus, differentials in wages between countries are not a necessary condition for migration.

finance.¹⁰ The choice of the household, which household member has to move depends on the function the member has in the household and on the likelihood of remitting money. In many societies parents have a greater control over girls than boys and, therefore, young women are more likely to be sent for family reasons.

Apart from these considerations, migration costs are more explicitly taken into account in these theories. Moving, finding housing, getting access to public services, finding employment, and building up social networks are very costly deterrents to migration. These costs can be much lower, however, if migrants use existing family and social networks for their migration decision, i.e. move to places where they can rely on an existing network of support (see, e.g. Massey et al., 2006). Two of the most distinct contributions of the new economics of migration is that it takes into account remittances as a factor that determines the migration decisions and that they consider migration costs. This theory also helps to explain why the poorest of the poor often do not migrate, although they are most affected by push factors; only those who are somewhat richer are able to overcome migration costs or rely on migration networks and can afford such complicated diversification strategies involving international migration. The new economics of migration also helps to explain, why migration does not stop if wage differential have been equalized. Incentives for migration remain if other markets within the sending countries like insurance, capital and consumer credit are absent or imperfect.

Both the neoclassical theory and also the new economics of migration are based on micro-level decision models. The *segmented labor market theory* (Piore 1979) does not take into account the micro-level decisions and focuses on higher aggregation levels by linking migration to the structural requirements of modern industrial economies. It is assumed that modern economies have a dualistic labor market: a primary market of secure, well-paid work and a secondary market of low-wage work. Developed countries have a permanent demand for migrant workers for several reasons due to upward inflexibility of wages at the bottom of the skill hierarchy and little motivation of native workers to take these jobs. In addition, the inherent duality of the labor market creates stable jobs at the higher skilled level to which the native workers are attracted to.

The *World System Theories* (Sassen 1988) also ignores the micro-level decision process focusing instead on focuses at higher aggregation levels. International migration follows the political and economic structure of a global market. Migration is seen as a logical consequence of economic globalization and market penetration. Globalization has created a mobile workforce willing to migrate for better job opportunities. Economic development gives people new skills, which leads to more migration an. In addition, trade

¹⁰ See below for a more detailed discussion of the impact on remittances on the national and the household level.

and political contracts between developing and developed countries create new linkages and opportunities that foster migration.

Complementary to these economic theories, there exist also attempts to explain migration from a more sociological and political perspective. From a sociological perspective social factors rather than economic factors determine migration flows, especially the existence of social formal and informal networks between the supply of workers and the demand of receiving countries. In particular, migrant networks increase the likelihood of international movement because they lower the costs and risks of movement and increase the expected return and, therefore, the propensity to migrate. The probability of finding a job in the destination country heavily depends on the demand for a specific occupation and on existing social networks of migrants having the same origin. Thus, transnational migration networks have a strong influence on the constitution and composition of groups of migrants. Migration networks constitute a form of social capital that enables people to gain access to various kinds of financial capital, i.e. employment, higher wages, and the possibility to send remittances (Massey et al. 1994, 2006). Therefore, networks create strong incentives to migrate as a strategy for risk diversification or utility maximization. And as networks expand economic factors have less influence on the migration decision than they have the social networks. These views are quite complementary to the new economics of migration that also specifically considers the role of migration networks.

From a political perspective, legal and regulatory barriers and entry opportunities are very important for the decision to migrate and should, therefore, be included into the theoretical framework to explain international migration (IOM 2002). As policies become more restrictive the costs and risks of migration rise. In many developed countries existing immigration policies are very selective in terms of education, skills, wealth, family connection, which determines the character and composition of migrants in the respective receiving countries. Also, migration flows will be affected by the level of enforcement to address illegal migration which clearly changes over time given prevailing political circumstances in a potential host country. Today, in a globalized world, distances are small but barriers raised by governments remain high.

Based on these different migration theories, a set of different determinants can be summarized that influence the migration decision of individuals and/or household to migrate internationally and with particular focus on migration of young people.

Table 3: Determinants of international Migration

Demographic factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population growth • Share of young adults in a population
Economic factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low economic growth • Wage gaps between receiving and sending countries • Unemployment (national and/or district level) • Differences in returns to skills (inequality) • Community infrastructure and public service differentials (e.g. access to safe water, health, education, pension and social security systems)
Political Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migration legislation and regulation • Refugee and asylum policies • Enforcement effort to reduce illegal migration (border control, repatriation, etc.)
Household/family factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Household welfare (income, land owner etc.) • Household structure (size, number of children and young adults, proportion of singles) • Previous mobility • Remittances • Family/community pressure • Number of migrants from place of origin
Individual factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Age • Gender • Education • Marital status • Networks (language barriers, information costs)

Source: Illustration by the authors.

The most important demographic factors that increase the propensity to migrate are large rates of population growth in sending countries and a large share of young people in the population. High fertility and large population growth produce large birth cohorts that increase the pressure for migration, because the large birth cohorts put pressure on the national labor market and on national infrastructure like schools, roads, and hospitals (see, e.g. Hatton and Williamson, 2003).

Economic factors at the macro-level that positively influence migration decisions are slow economic growth, combined with gaps in the wages, employment or unemployment rates, and returns to skill between the sending and receiving country. For example, Castaldo et al. (2005) use household survey data for Albania to examine the factor that drive international migration. Besides family factors they find that both local labor market conditions and community characteristics strongly influence the decision to migrate. Furthermore, an important pull factor is the well-functioned and established infrastructure in the destination countries regarding health care, education, and social security and pension systems.

Clearly, political factors also play a role including migration policies and their enforcement in potential receiving countries, including refugee and asylum policies. They can particularly affect migration destination countries. For example, the extent to which

old EU members have opened up their labor markets to migrations from new EU members is heavily affecting migration flows within the EU (Horsewood et al. XXX); similarly, as the USA has become somewhat more restrictive in allowing migrants (particularly from certain regions), while Europe has in general become more accommodating of migration (particularly of people with skills), migration flows have changed accordingly.

The decision to migrate is also a decision of the family, particularly in developing countries. Especially household poverty is an important driving force for migration. On the one hand, as higher the relative poverty of a household and as higher the level of deprivation, as higher is the willingness to migrate. However, on the other hand, very poor households lack of resources necessary to migrate resulting in a lower possibility to migrate. The poorer the households, the higher are the information costs of movements, which is the reason why many very poor households do not migrate.

Root and De Jong (1991) pointed out the importance of the family structure, the socio-economic resources of the family, and family ties to the place of origin as the main factors that determine the migration decision process. Families where the partner works have a lower propensity to migrate than singles. In this context, the previous mobility of household member can also positively influence the migration decision and the same household for the number of household member that already have moved abroad. If many households within the same community send household member away to count on remittances, than this can increase the social pressure for other households to follow.

Several individual characteristics influence a person's mobility. For example, Lee (1966) pointed out that migration is a selective process because differences in age, gender, and social class affect the ability to and decision of migration. The propensity to migrate increases with the age of the individual, peaking in the early twenties. The migration theories provide also explanations for high youth participation in migration due to individual, family and community factors. The older the person the lower the expected gain from migration, the higher the costs and thus the lower the propensity to migrate (see, e.g. Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999). The young are more likely to migrate because of individual, family and community socio-economic characteristics. From the argument that migration can be seen as an investment, young people are likely to ace lower costs in moving and have higher lifetime return (World Bank 2007). However, while the opportunity costs of migration are lower for the youth and the motivation is higher, policy conditions and personal circumstances determine the migration decision. For example, if legal migration requires tertiary education or high job experiences young people are less likely to migrate. The opportunity to obtain a better education is one the major motivations for young people to migrate. In particular, tertiary education in another country is growing

motive to migrate.¹¹ Higher levels of education is considered as a positive determinant for migration because it increases income returns and provide better abilities to process relevant information, thus, lowering migration cost. Existing social networks determine the likelihood of especially young people to migrate. If other young people have migrated before, social networks lower the costs and increase the benefits of other young people to migrate too.

Based on micro-data, McKenzie (2006) examines the age and gender composition of young migrants, whether they move alone or with their family, and their participation at school and their employment status in the destination country, what types of jobs they do and whether or when they move back to their home country. He finds that young people are more likely to migrate and the youth are a large share of the flow of migrants; the share of young females varies across countries but averaging around 50 percent; female migrants are more likely to be married and accompanying a spouse than male migrants; there is a substantial migration for education; young migrants tend to be more concentrated in a few occupation than older migrant workers; the age of return varies between 25 and 30, which leaves much time for working in the their country of origin.

2.3 Migration and Economic Development

While not a main focus of this paper, we want to briefly discuss the central findings on the impact of migration on sending and receiving countries. Migration contributes to the level of social welfare, human capital formation, and economic and social development both in the host countries and the countries of origin through various channels. And the migration of the youth plays a particularly important role. From the perspective of many developed countries, particularly in Europe, which face the problem of an aging population, youth migration creates the opportunity to favorably affect the age structure of the population to insure economic development and to sustain the social security system. From a developing country perspective migration of the youth offers a way for young people to increase income and invest into their human capital resulting in positive potential externalities for the home countries that are associated with having higher educated and more skilled population. Researchers in economics have emphasized the migration process as an important determinant of economic development for a long time. At this, migration can be both an opportunity for sending and receiving g countries but also can lead to economic problems for both.

¹¹ In addition to that, it often serves as the only legal way for young people from developing countries to migrate to developed countries (World Bank 2007).

Impact on receiving countries

Today, countries in Western Europe are more and more concerned with the challenge of their aging populations and with the role that international migration might play to mitigate this problem in the long run. Issues that arise besides the problem of the aging populations are the shortages of the working age population, rising dependency ratios and payment of pensions, and a possible shortage both of unskilled and skilled labor (see, e.g. Punch and Pearce, 2000).¹² Many European countries have realized that international migration, which is dominated by the young, is an important element in future demographic and economic development (Haug et al. 2002). Migrants can play an important role to deal with the demographic problems of European countries. The United Nations has estimated that countries in Europe would need between one and 13 million migrants per year between the year 2000 and 2050 to cope with the potential problems described above (United Nations 2000).¹³ Migration rapidly enhances the labor force and generally improves the dependency ratio, at least in the short to medium term.¹⁴

Although the aging societies in Western Europe gain from international migration of the youth, receiving countries typically are concerned that migrants lower national welfare by increasing unemployment and lowering wages for native workers. A large body of literature exists that measures the effects of immigration on the wages of native workers. For example, recent research from the United Kingdom and the United States show no significant evidence for an adverse effect on wages through immigration (see, e.g. Borjas, 2003; Card, 2005, and Dustmann et al., 2005). Overall the average effect is found to be small but positive.¹⁵ Whether the effects are positive or negative depends on whether migration leads to a substitution of domestic labor, i.e. workers with similar professional profiles, or to a complement of domestic workers, i.e. migrants that fill an existing gap of labor demand, especially of jobs that native workers are not willing to do.¹⁶ Cross-country studies for European countries found that the negative effects on the wages of young workers tend to be higher if labor market restrictions are more rigid such as in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. For countries with a more flexible labor market like Denmark, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, the negative effects from youth immigration are

¹² See, also Figure A1 for the estimated development of the old age dependency ratio in the EU.

¹³ Alternative measures to fill this demographic gap are moving the total fertility rate back to the replacement level, increasing the labor force participation of the national population (Holzmann 2005).

¹⁴ However, some authors argue that such numbers of migrants would be unrealistic to expect and even wish for mainly due to difficulty to incorporate such a big scale of migrants in the national economic and social systems (see e.g. Feld 2000; Coleman and Rowthorne 2004).

¹⁵ See, for example, Pischke and Velling (1997) for Germany, Winter-Ebner and Zweimüller (1997) for Austria, Dolado et al. (1996) for Spain, Longhi et al. (2005), and Angrist and Kugler (2003).

¹⁶ In addition, the capital intensity of work plays a crucial role for the impact of migration on domestic wages. No negative effect can be expected if the growth in labour supply due to migration is accompanied by a sufficient accumulation of capital.

very small (Angrist and Kugler 2003). Additionally, the recent enlargement of the EU shows an overall positive impact of the increased migration into countries in Western Europe (Portes and French 2005). The majority of workers are aged between 18 and 34. The main impact of the inflow of the relative young labor force was to relieve labor market shortages and had little impact on native workers (Portes and French 2005).

Migration also directly affects the social welfare and security systems in developed countries. In countries with well-developed and well-functioned social welfare systems, migrants contribute to the functioning of these systems through their payments of taxes and social insurance fees. This holds especially for young migrants. Here, their contribution exceeds their benefits and, therefore, they relieve pressure on the social welfare systems in the host countries.

A further channel through which migration affects the development in receiving countries lies in the social dimension of migration. Economic effects of migration can also be determined by social issues, for example, due to problems of integration of migrant workers and their children. Important for the integration is the length of stay. The awareness of this issue has risen in the last few years among policy makers. Many migrants who live in the second generation in European countries have still relatively low language skills and have, on average, lower educational levels, which hamper them to participate at the live of the society of the host country. This is partly due to the initial uncertainty of the length of stay in host countries (as perceived by both migrants as well as policy-makers in host countries), few efforts to promote integration and the acquisition of language skills in some host countries, and large migrant groups that enabled to ability to function in native languages in enclaves dominated by migrants.

Impact on sending countries

The most obvious and visible and direct contribution of migrant workers to the economic development of their home countries is the money they bring home or send to their families. Migrant remittances are defined as monetary transfers that a migrant makes to the country of origin (IOM 2006).¹⁷ In the last five years, remittances received by developing countries have doubled and remittances from rich countries played the most important role here (World Bank 2006).¹⁸ For most developing countries with a chronic trade deficit, remittances constitute the major means of financing this gap. Remittances of

¹⁷ This is a very broad definition of remittances. According to the annually IMF Balance of Payments Statistical Yearbook, remittances can be defined as three different streams of transfers, workers remittances, compensation of employees, and migrant transfers. In addition, some authors include also the transfers of skills, technology, and also “social remittances” into the definition of remittances (see, e.g. Baruah, 2006).

¹⁸ In some countries, remittances are even a larger source of external financing than foreign aid. The world’s largest recipients of remittances as a proportion of GDP are Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania (IOM 2006).

migrants also constitute an important source foreign exchange and domestic savings and also play an important role in reducing poverty and inequality because remittances may increase health and education opportunities and/or create new decision making power for women (see, e.g. Caglor and Schiff, 2005). In addition, remittances often flow more continuously than foreign direct investments and often exceed the payment of foreign aid. The first round effect of remittances is that the transfers ensure consumption of the household. The second round effect is that remittances can provide migrant households with income security that enables them to invest in education, new technologies and production activities. In particular, potential benefits of children in households receiving remittances are a rise their standard of living through investments in their education and health (see, e.g. Roberts, 2004; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2005; Rapoport and Docquir, 2005;), which lead to a rise in the stock of human capital at the macro-level. However, while the positive impact of remittances at the micro-level are clear; the impact at the macro-level is not. Whereas large flows of remittances facilitate debt payments, they can also increase inflation rates and the official exchange rate, which hampers the export economy.

However, one major concern of governments in developing countries is the lost of this potential gains from migration if the young people do not return to their home country. Developing countries face a dilemma with respect migration and human capital formation. On the one hand, migration allows the accumulation of human capital resulting in higher domestic productivity levels. On the other hand, the opportunity costs for skilled worker to return to their home country are relatively high and, therefore, many highly educated migrants stay abroad, decreasing human capital in their home country. The fear of *brain drain* is most evident in the health sector as a result of the migration of doctors and nurses and the risk of negative effects of brain drain is higher for small and very poor countries.

However, recent studies show that many young migrants return to their home countries at relatively young ages (Word Bank 2007). This temporary migration can have a large impact on poverty reduction. The World Bank has estimated that a three percent increase in the global stock of migrants by 2025 would lead to an increase of global income that is estimated to be higher than the removing all trade barriers (World Bank 2005). And a large proportion of this impact is due to migration of the youth. In addition, remittances from highly skilled migrant workers tend to be higher than from low skilled migrant workers. Thus, higher skilled migrant workers have a greater potential for investments in education of future human capital (Hugo 1996). In the medium-term, from these higher potential investment in education lead to larger general level of education strengthens the growth prospects, which attracts more foreign investors, which then leads to a higher share of high skilled migrants who return.

Related to this effect, some scholars have argued that the prospect of migration is leading to greater investments in human capital in sending countries. This 'brain gain' effect can be larger than the 'brain drain' of those that end up migrating (Stark and Fan 2007).

Migration also directly affects the labor market in the sending countries. The impact of migration on the domestic labor market in the sending countries mainly depends on the existing level of unemployment, especially in the low-skilled job sector. Since many developing countries are characterized by a young population structure and a large share of young unskilled worker whose impose strong pressure on the domestic job markets, the outflow of low skilled worker has often a positive impact on the labor market of the sending countries, because it lowers the unemployment rate and reduces the surplus of labor. Furthermore, migration also plays an important role for the social development of the sending countries. Since many young people leave, the cultural and religious identities and backgrounds of families and communities in the home countries are affected by migration.

Migration and poverty

The question of the how international migration is related to poverty and vice versa is a very complex issue. For example, Skeldon (2003) generates several hypothesizes on the relation ship between international migration and poverty. He argues that migration can be both the root cause of poverty as well as the result of poverty. Similarly, poverty may be the root cause of migration as well as the result of migration.

Migration can play an important role for poverty alleviation. On the one hand, international migration can directly widen the opportunities and access to resources that would be not achievable in the case of non-migrating.¹⁹ On the other hand, international migration can also indirectly help to reduce poverty in the home country, if remittances raise the standard of living of those household members who were left behind. However, as described before, remittances can also increase inequality and brain drain can also increase poverty in the home country. Therefore, a simple generalization about the interrelation of poverty and international migration are impossible to deduce. The relationship and direction of causality depends, among other things, mainly on the level of development of the country or region under consideration. It is very likely that the relationship differs between poor countries in Sub- Saharan Africa and richer OECD countries.

¹⁹ However, typically the very poor, those who might have the strongest incentives to migrate, do not move because they can not afford the costs for migration. Hence, 'survival migration' generally takes place locally or regionally within countries.

Moreover, regardless of these overall effects of migration on aggregate poverty, the migrant will perceive poverty quite differently. In the host countries, many migrants will find themselves disproportionately among the poor (this is especially true for unskilled migrants), while they might be among the better-off when compared to the peers they left behind in the sending country. While the migrant often will see an improvement of the standard of living, compared with the sending country and their own position there, migrant children might see more their poorer position in the host country; so they may feel poorer and more marginalized than their parent generation. This will be important to consider when studying the well-being of migrant children in Europe.

2.4 International Migration in Europe

2.4.1 The European Migration System

Whereas the international migration of workers is a global phenomenon, three main directions of flows can be distinguished. First, from the East to the West, i.e. from the Transition countries of Eastern Europe including the successor states of the Soviet Union into countries in Western Europe; second, from the South to the North, i.e. from developing countries into industrialized countries (particularly strong in the Americas) and, third, from the South to the South, i.e. from very poor developing countries to less poor developing countries.²⁰ Although migration systems differ across countries with respect to the size of inflows and regarding the dominant origins of international migrants, they also show one distinct common indicator. Today, most immigrants come from countries or regions that are characterized by limited supply of capital and overall labor-intensive economies. In addition, large imbalances between receiving and destination countries exist also in the levels of wealth, income, power, economic growth. The sending countries towards these systems depend on historical links of colonization, trade, politics and culture but, in general, all are in the south and are relatively poor (Massey et al. 2006). Concentrating on the European migration system, this region is dominated by two major receiving areas. The largest flow of migrants come from countries in Eastern Europe, particularly Germany, Switzerland and Austria. The second largest inflow come from countries of North Africa, particular moving to France (Massey 2006).

²⁰ The South South migration is very often not a permanent migration but rather provides a basis for further movements in richer countries. With respect to the movement of people from developing countries, The 'South South' movement is as important as the 'South North' movement. About one half of the reported international migrants that come from developing countries move into other developing countries (ILO 2004). Please note that there is also a North-North migration of mobile highly skilled workers moving throughout the industrialized world. While some of the well-being issues identified here might be relevant for them as well, these (generally quite privileged) migrants and their children will not be of particular concern here.

According to Ardittis (1990), the evolution of European migration can be summarized into five main phases. The first phase started with the beginning of the 20th century and lasted until the early 1950s. During this phase Europe was a major region of emigration, sending a significant number of workers to the rest of the world. The economies in Western Europe experienced a phase of strong economic growth that has increased the demand for labor in the 1960s. of active recruiting took during the 1950s and 1960s.

The second phase started in the early 1950s and lasted until the early 1970s (see, e.g. Stalker, 1994). As a result of rapid economic expansion that was accompanied by low population growth, several nations, especially Germany and Switzerland, experienced serious labor shortages. The demand for labor was satisfied by migrants from Southern Europe followed by migrants from North Africa. During the 1970s, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, the former countries of net emigration that were relative intensive in labor, also began importing migrant workers mainly form the Middle East and North Africa (Massey et al. 2006).

The third phase began with the oil price shock in the year 1973, which leads to a phase of economic recession for many countries (United Nations 2004). During this phase countries of Western Europe stopped their recruitment programs and adopted more restrictive migration policies to limit the number of immigrants; immigration was largely restricted to family reunification and asylum seekers.

By the early 1980s the economic and political configuration of Europe was changing. The fourth phase began in the mid of the 1980s and was characterized by a sharp increase of migrants from the Eastern Europe. Asylum applications rose everywhere. Inflows to Europe from countries in Eastern and Central Europe started to increase in the mid 1980s when some regimes have weakened their travel restrictions. Especially Germany recorded a large increase of inflows from these countries, mainly because of the admission of the *Aussiedler*, i.e. ethnic Germans who had the right to German citizenship upon their entry into the country and who have mainly originated in Kazakhstan, Poland and the Russian Federation. In Europe, between 1980 and 1990 the number of international migration rose from 4.1 million to 26.3 million (United Nations 2004).

The fifth phase started in the 1990s and is characterized by the consolidation of Western Europe as an internal market with free movement of EU citizens between member countries and by the incorporation of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe into the EU. At the same time, restrictions for asylum applications have been tightened. Since the end of the 1990s several countries in Western Europe have eased the opportunities and for temporary migration of workers, which are regulated by bilateral agreements between the respective countries.

A distinctive feature of international migration to countries in Western Europe is that European government sought to recruit 'temporary' migrants or 'guest worker' who would return, once the economic conditions under which they were brought in, i.e. the shortage of labor, disappeared. However, large numbers of migrants workers opted to settle permanently in Europe began to bring their families into Europe. As a result, whereas the number of immigrant workers stopped growing, the size of the foreign population continued to rise (Martin and Miller 1980). In contrast to international migrants in the US, migrants live in Western European countries come to a large extent from other countries in Europe (including Turkey).

As a result of the improved economic climate in Europe in the late 1990s, the number of international migrants rose to 32.8 million by the year 2000 (United Nations 2004). Today, the EU 25 has 455 million habitants with 381 million living in the EU 15. The patterns and processes of migration are very complex. The continuing demand for immigrants, accompanied by relatively high rate of unemployment among the national population and a growing ethnic diversity leads makes international migration a complex phenomenon that governments seek to manage through entry policies that attempt to ease immigration of desired highly skilled migrants while tightening rules of immigration for others. In the next years the biggest effects on the European migration system will be enlargement of the EU by ten new countries bringing 75 million people into the EU.

Two points in this short discussion are particularly noteworthy. First, migration policies have changed drastically over time, sometimes encouraging migration, sometimes trying to reduce inflows. More recently, policies towards economic immigration have generally become more welcoming, certainly for those within the EU and the accession states, but also beyond. But secondly, the migrant stock in any European country at this time comprises a very heterogeneous population that entered the host country at very different times under very different circumstances. Germany is a good example of this heterogeneous migrant stock. On the one hand, you have second-generation immigrants whose parents came as a result of active recruitment in the 1950s and 1960s (who entered with little though given on whether and how to integrate these populations). Then there are asylum seekers who came in the 1970s and 1980s from all over the world, and refugees from the Balkan wars of the 1990s; there are immigrants from Eastern Europe with German passports that constituted the bulk of legal immigration; there are increasing flows of labor of all categories within the EU; and now there are increasing numbers of immigrants with high skills from all over the world, who come as a result of more welcoming immigration policies. In addition, there are large numbers of illegal immigrants, particularly from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, plus forced migration, trafficking and migration for prostitution. It is therefore not surprising that it

will be quite difficult to study well-being and its determinants in such a heterogeneous population. All the more is it important to tackle this issue. Some of this heterogeneity will be discussed below in more detail.

2.4.2 Current Trends in Migration in Europe

In recent years the EU has become a more integrated migration system that is characterized both by a high mobility and circulation of informal and short-term movements and also by long-term movements quite similar to the guest worker phase between the 1950s and 1960s (Salt 2005). According to estimates of Eurostat and national statistical offices, the total numbers of non-nationals currently living in the EU in 2004 was about 25 million, which is almost 5.5 percent of the total population. The greater part of this stock of foreign population lives in countries of Western Europe.²¹ Germany is Europe's most important destination country of migration with annually inflows of migrants that exceeded the numbers of inflows of all other Western European countries. Table 4 shows that by far the largest number of non-nationals lives in Germany, followed by France, the UK and the Netherlands. One reason for this large inflow is the large number of the so called *Aussiedler* countries from central and Eastern Europe and from the CIS who invoke their right to German citizenship IOM (2000). In contrast, although some countries in Central and Eastern Europe have also experienced some permanent migration, flows have been relatively modest and stocks are relatively low.²²

Regarding the growth of the stock of migrants in Europe, western European countries can roughly be separated into two main groups: north Western Europe and Southern Europe. Whereas the former countries have experienced a large numbers of migrants during the last decades, the latter group has become a net migration region quite recently. In Western Europe, the historical shift from emigration to immigration is evident. In 2005, all Western European countries had a positive growth of the migrants stock (except Belgium) (Table 4). In addition, in several EU countries, population growth mainly stems from migration, with the exception of Denmark, France, Malta, Netherland and Finland where population growth is mainly due to native population growth. In addition, migration also contributes to a positive population growth since part of the observed fertility can be attributed to migrants, who are usually younger than the indigenous population (and often have, at least temporarily, higher fertility rates).

²¹ If one considers the great disparities in wealth between sending and receiving countries, the actual size of migrants is likely to be quite modest compared to the potential size of migrants who would move towards Western European countries if the system were left to operate without state interferences to constrain immigration.

²² Table 4 shows that among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, most migrants live in the Russian Federation.

Table 4: Stock and Flows of Migrants in Europe

	Estimated number of international migrants at mid-year				Growth rate of migrant stock (percentage)			
	1990	1995	2000	2005	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005
Europe	49381119	55286554	58216735	64115850	3.1	2.3	1	1.9
Western Europe								
Austria	473341	717164	926835	1233546	10.3	8.3	5.1	5.7
Belgium	899357	909044	879262	719276	0.3	0.2	-0.7	-4
Denmark	220193	249747	304249	388535	2.9	2.5	3.9	4.9
Finnland	60969	102547	134135	156179	4.6	10.4	5.4	3
France	5906752	6089154	6277189	6471029	-0.2	0.6	0.6	0.6
Germany	5936181	9092443	9802793	10143626	na	8.5	1.5	0.7
Greece	411923	548718	730941	973677	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7
Iceland	9005	10549	15610	23097	4.3	3.2	7.8	7.8
Ireland	229924	264131	384872	585429	0.4	2.8	7.5	8.4
Italy	1346174	1483253	1634290	2519040	1.9	1.9	1.9	8.7
Luxembourg	113936	135205	160645	173645	1.9	3.4	3.4	1.6
Netherlands	1191634	1386821	1563564	1638104	9	3	2.4	0.9
Norway	184740	231000	298616	343929	3.6	4.5	5.1	2.8
Portugal	435766	527901	634934	763668	4.6	3.8	3.7	3.7
Spain	765585	1009021	1628246	4790074	12.7	5.5	9.6	21.6
Sweden	780698	905628	992623	1117286	3.7	3	1.8	2.4
Switzerland	1376417	1471205	1562606	1659686	2.7	1.3	1.2	1.2
Turkey	1150463	1210113	1259322	1328405	4.3	1	0.8	1.1
United Kingdom	3753370	4198050	4764824	5408118	0.7	2.2	2.5	2.5
Central and Eastern Europe								
Bulgaria	21510	46610	101000	104076	-0.3	15.5	15.5	0.6
Czech Republic	424498	453713	453489	453265	na	1.3	0	0
Estonia	382012	308781	249588	201743	na	-4.3	-4.3	-4.3
Hungary	347510	293266	295990	316209	0.5	-3.4	0.2	1.3
Latvia	805491	712915	539728	449215	na	-2.4	-5.6	-3.7
Lithuania	349233	272110	212018	165197	na	-5	-5	-5
Poland	1127166	962951	822660	702808	-3.1	-3.1	-3.1	-3.1
Romania	142770	134972	134204	133441	-3.4	-1.1	-0.1	-0.1
Russian Federation	11524948	11706951	11891829	12079626	na	0.3	0.3	0.3
Slovakia	41295	113501	118458	124464	na	20.2	0.9	1

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, Trends in total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision.

The foreign born population in Western Europe is distributed quite unequally. Table 5 shows that the proportion of the foreign-born population varies from 1.9 percent in Turkey to 32.6 percent in Luxembourg, but in the majority of country the proportion of foreign-born population was between 2 and 8 percent.

Table 5: Foreign born population in selected European countries (2000-2001)

	Foreign born (in 1000)	Proportion of total population	Foreign born with the citizenship of the country of residence (in 1000)	Percentage of foreign born with the citizenship of the country of residence	Percentage of non citizens
Austria	1002.5	12.5	408.1	40.7	8.8
Belgium	1099.2	10.7	447.6	40.8	8.2
Denmark	361.1	6.8	145.5	40.3	5
Finland	131.4	2.5	54.1	41.6	1.7
France	5868.2	10	3114.7	53.1	5.6
Germany	10256.1	12.5	na	na	na
Greece	1122.6	10.03	466.2	41.5	7
Ireland	400	10.4	179	45.2	5.9
Luxembourg	142.7	32.6	18.6	13	36.9
Netherlands	1615.4	10.1	1050.6	65	4.2
Norway	333.8	7.3	158.9	47.6	4.3
Poland	775.3	2.1	741.9	96.1	0.1
Spain	2172.2	5.3	671.5	30.9	3.8
Sweden	1077.6	12	673	62.5	5.3
Switzerland	1570.8	22.4	459.6	29.3	20.5
Turkey	1259	1.9	na	na	na
United Kingdom	4865.6	8.3	na	na	na
Czech Republic	448.5	4.5	357.4	79.8	1.2
Hungary	292.9	2.9	208.3	71.1	0.9
Slovakia	119.1	2.5	98.4	84.2	0.5

Source: Calculation by the OECD based on national censuses; Dumont and Lemaitre (2004).

Most international migrants move between countries within Europe.²³ Despite the importance of immigration from other European countries, there are also significant numbers form migrants from developing countries. In Western Europe, France is the dominant destination country for non-EU migration. Almost half of the stock of international migration comes from African countries.²⁴ Despite a growing diversification of the countries of origin of international migrants towards Western European countries, no significant diversification can be observed regarding the destination of migrants from a given origin. In other words, nearly all Algerian migrants live in France, whereas most migrants from Greece, Poland and Turkey live in Germany (United Nations 2004); more recently, many Poles have also moved to Britain and Ireland, largely as a result of the free labor migration offered by these EU countries (Horsewood et al. XX) The transition countries (CETs) constitute a large region of emigration. In Europe, besides Switzerland and Italy, Germany is the main receiving country of migrants from the CETs, driven by the strong historical link between Germany and many Eastern European countries and the

²³ See Table A2 in the Appendix.

²⁴ Table A2 shows that also in Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, and the UK have the stock of international migrants exceeds the 10 percent.

geographical closeness (United Nations 2002); more liberal labor migration rules have also ensured that Britain and Ireland are becoming important destinations. The enlargement of the EU to the East is likely to further accelerate migration flows from the East to West; first Germany and Austria are likely to receive more migrants, but in the medium term they are likely to move beyond these countries.

The composition of the stock of the foreign population in countries in Western Europe is characterized by the inflow of the migrant after the war induced to the shortage of labor and more recently (since 1970) by the phase of migration associated with family reunion and formation and with refugees both from within and without Europe. Thus, the highest share of foreign nationality within the countries in Europe reflects from which countries labor force has been recruited since the Second World War and also particular historical links between these countries, their bilateral relationship with former colonies and also the entry opportunities for refugees, both politically and geographically (Salt 2005).

Almost half of today's international migrants are women (United Nations 2004a). In Europe, the share was even 53.4 percent in the year 2005.²⁵ During the last decades, there were continuously growing female specific sectors, especially in the tertiary and health sector and private housing, which have accelerated the migration of woman. Whereas for a long time women had only moved with their family, today, more and more women move alone and leave their families behind, which leads to the high share of the stock of female migrants. Young people built a higher flow of international migrants than the stock. About in third of all migrants from developing countries are young people, building about one fifth of the stock (World Bank 2007). This means that the age structure of migrants has become younger in recent years.

The differences in the age structures between national and non-national populations in the EU are sizable. Whereas the proportion of children and young adults (ages between 0 and 19) do not differ very much, for older age groups considerable differences exist. The most significant difference is found for the population aged 65 and older. Whereas this age group accounts for about 17 percent of the population, the share for non-nationals is only about 9 percent (Eurostat 2006).

²⁵ See, Table A1 in the Appendix.

Table 6: Age structure of the Immigrant Population with country of birth known, EU 15 (2002)

	0-14	15-24	25-54	55-64	65+
EU West (2)	6.62	9.15	51.72	13.3	19.21
EU South (3)	1.45	4.36	48.65	19.41	26.13
CEEC (4)	7.27	13.24	57.25	8.84	13.4
Turkey (others)	4.15	11.65	69.32	8.19	6.69
Africa, Middle East	2.31	7.8	59.12	15.5	15.26
USA, Canada, Australia	12.41	10.17	62.93	5.34	9.14
Latin, America, Caribb.	8.53	16.28	62.79	4.65	7.75
Asia	5.05	9.46	60.83	11.35	13.31
Total	4.68	8.76	56.01	13.49	17.07
EU 15	16.59	12.01	43.42	11.37	16.6

Notes: (1) Data for Germany and Italy not available; (2) EU 15 (except Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain) + Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland; (3) Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain; (4) New EU Member States, candidate countries, other countries in Central/Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia

Source: (1) LFS 2002, taken from Münz and Fassmann (2004).

The profile of educational attainment of the foreign-born population within the EU differs from that of the total population. Based on LFS data, Münz (2004) shows for the year 2002 that the share of people with low skills is higher among migrants than the share among the population of the EU15 (52 percent compared to 48 percent) (Münz 2004). However, also the share of high skilled is higher among the migrants than the share among the EU 15 (20 percent compared to 17 percent). A large difference can be observed when looking at medium skilled population. Here, the migrants are to a large extent underrepresented (28 percent compared to 39 percent of the EU15 average). The main reason for this is the high demand of the market economies in Western Europe for high and low skilled labor. Looking at differences in employment rates between migrants and the total population of the EU 15, it is observed that in the year 2002, on average, migrants have a slightly lower employment rate (61 percent) and higher unemployment rate (9.7 percent) than the average population of the EU 15 (64 percent and 7.8 percent, respectively) (Münz 2004).

Trends in the numbers of asylum seekers

Whereas, family reunification remains comprises the largest share of authorized foreign migration (IOM 2000), another group of migrants to and within Europe are asylum seekers. Inflows of asylum seekers to countries in Western Europe have varied both in absolute numbers and between countries of destination since the end of the 1980s (Salt 2005). In the beginning of the 1990s, countries in Western Europe have experienced an increase of around 40 percent of the number of asylum seekers (670,000 applications in 1992). Since then the number has decreased rapidly to 226,000 in the year 1996. Then,

Europe recorded again an increase in asylum seekers and about 430,000 persons applied in 1999 (IOM 2000). Asylum requests spread widely across countries in Western Europe. Germany, which is still the main destination country for asylum seekers, the number of asylum requests continuously decreased since 1999. The reason for this change reflects a changing situation in Europe with respect to more restrictive entry policies. France, The United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium and Denmark have experienced a sharp rise in asylum requests in the last few years.

Trends in illegal migration

In recent years much attention has been paid to the problem of illegal migration including also the smuggling of human beings, especially women and children, and international trafficking and the enormous complexities of irregular migration has become more apparent (see, e.g. Salt and Hogarth, 2000). For example, Passel (2006) estimates that about one third of the foreign born population in the U.S. are unauthorized migrants and that are 6 million children, which accounts for 6 percent of all children in the U.S., in families in which either the household head or the spouse is a unauthorized migrant. Besides the issues of violations of human rights and a low status of well-being that are inherent with trafficking and human smuggling, from a statistical point of view, unrecorded or irregular migration remains one of the biggest concerns leading to fundamental gaps of knowledge relating to most aspects of this problem. The main reasons for the lack of data availability on irregular or illegal migration are, firstly, the problem of identifying and counting people who are not registered in some form and, secondly, the problem of different country-specific legislations and definitions on legality and illegality migration, which results in lack of comparable data on illegal migration (see, e.g. Futo and Tass 2001). Data on the scale of irregular migration are either based on estimates or on the principle that those people living irregularly in a country will, in some point, manifest their identity in researchable form. Therefore, reliable information about the actual amount of irregular migration across Europe barely exists and estimates should be treated with caution.

Some statistical sources exist that shed light on the magnitude of illegal migration. Estimates of the number of illegal or unauthorized migrants in Europe vary between 3 million (IOM 2000) in the late 1990s and 3,3 million in 2000 (ILO 2004). Some authors have provided various methods to estimate the amount of illegal migration in Europe. For example, Jandl (2004) examines several methods to estimate the size of illegal migration (or illegal border crossing) and illustrates the approaches for Austria. Attempts to estimate the actual number of irregular migration in Europe gives a crude picture of the problem. For example, Baldassarni estimates that about 600,000 illegal workers live in Italy and a

range of 70-180,000 illegal workers live in Switzerland (Piguet and Losa 2002).²⁶ Data on flows of migrants are usually based on information on border crossing data. A recent study by ICMPD (ICMPD 2004) reports more than 160,000 apprehensions at the borders of 17 CEE countries. Compared to previous periods, the number of apprehensions has decreased for most European countries. The reason for this decline might be due to fewer attempts of border crossing as a result of better border management in Western European countries, which are still the main destinations countries for illegal border crossings. The study by ICMPD shows that most illegal migrants are males aged between 20 and 45 and only about one fifth of illegal migrations are women. The main regions from which illegal migrants come from are the countries of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia and Romania.²⁷

While trafficking, forced labor, and prostitution also among children and the youth is an increasing form of illegal and/or undocumented migration, data availability remains inadequate only few estimates exist. For instance, Heckmann and Wunderlich (2000) estimate for the EU in 1999 a number 400,000 people from both sexes.²⁸ For Germany, Laczko et al (2002) shows that the main suppliers of illegal migration through trafficking in women and children are the CEE countries. Data of the IOM estimated that 81 percent of victims of trafficking between 2001 and 2005 were females and 71 percent were aged between 14 and 24 (Omelaniuk 2005). A study from Western Europe shows that the majority of victims of trafficking end up in the sex industry (Clert et al. 2005).

It is reasonable to assume that the number of potential migrants to Europe that have not yet taken the step (due to legal, administrative, or financial hurdles) is substantial. A large number of young people in developing countries express a strong desire to migrate. The large proportion of the youth in developing countries and the aging societies in developed countries is likely to increase the demand and the flows of international migration. In the near future, the inflow of migrants from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa is very likely to grow for several reasons. Because the demographic gap between the latter group of countries and those in Western Europe will grow rapidly. From countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the flow of migrants is estimated to annually between 1.5 million and 2.1 million by 2025 (Hatton and Williamson 2003).

²⁶ One of the main sources of these estimates used as an indicator of illegal workers lies on the number of workers who applied to regularize their status when amnesty programs were introduced (Salt 2005).

²⁷ In addition, Jandl (2007) shows that the main stream of irregular migration is from the west to the east of Europe.

²⁸ In general, estimates of illegal border crossing considered as trafficking or smuggling rely on assumptions about the ratio between apprehensions and about those who have succeeded the illegal border crossing (see, e.g. Salt 2005; Heckmann et al 2000). However, the numbers of trafficked or smuggled people is very likely to be underestimated because a smuggler is also registered if he or she is caught.

3. Migration and Well-being of Children and Youth

3.1 Measuring Human Well-being

Well-being is a description of an individual's standard of living. Although very different terms are used to describe well-being, here the term is used as synonymous to 'quality of life'.²⁹ Thus, well-being concepts try to assess an individuals' current standard of living. In addition, well-being indicators are also used to measure progress towards specific benchmarks set, for example, by the international community such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Several issues arise when conceptualizing and measuring human well-being. The first issue is concerned with the question of the identification of the relevant dimensions of well-being and of an appropriate measure for the living standard of individuals, i.e. what should 'well-being' measures try to measure? Historically, the measurement of poverty and well-being was dominated by the notion of economic well-being, i.e. equating the standard of living of person in terms of income and consumption levels. Improvements in human well-being are associated with a rise in average incomes or consumption levels per capita, or with a decreasing number of people below a specific poverty line, which is defined as the minimum threshold to satisfy the daily basic needs and which separates the poor from the non-poor.

However, besides monetary poverty, individuals might also suffer from several other dimensions of poverty, which have to be taken into account both when measuring well-being and poverty and when deducing policy implications for poverty reduction. For example, many households and individuals suffer from malnourishment, infectious diseases, and have very poor access to public social infrastructure like health care systems, piped drinking water, sanitation and education. Certainly, higher income or expenditures levels would improve a person's or household's position in some non-monetary dimensions of poverty (Kanbur and Squire 2001). But at the same time, an increase in income is not a guarantee for an improvement in the non-income dimensions of poverty (see, e.g. Klasen, 2000; Grimm et al., 2002; Günther and Klasen, 2007). While a large number of studies find a positive correlation between income and non-income dimensions of poverty, the measurement of direct outcomes of human well-being and of its distribution has the advantage that it does not require the adoption of any hypotheses about this correlation.

In this context, Sen's capability approach (1985, 1987, 1988, and 1999) links well-being to broader concepts of freedom and human rights. Sen focuses on the multidimensionality of poverty and defines human well-being in terms of functionings and capabilities, where functionings are achievements of human well-being and capabilities

²⁹ For a detailed overview about different terms of well-being, see, for example, McGillivray (2007).

the ability to achieve these functionings. The main advantage of the capability or rights-based approach is that it focuses directly on achievements in assessing well-being in terms of capabilities to achieve valuable functionings. In other words, well-being is defined as the 'end' to be achieved and capability as the freedom to achieve it (UNDP, 1990, 2000).³⁰ As money-metric indicators of poverty reflect only the means to achieve some (but far from all) functionings, they serve only as indirect measure of the standard of living, whereas direct measures are, for example, the status and access to health and education, which are two fundamental outcomes of human well-being and important factors for economic development (see e.g. Schultz, 1999; Strauss and Duncan, 1998). Thus, income is a 'means' and not an 'end'.

Applying this concept to the well-being of children necessitates some adjustments. First, it has to be recognized that children typically live as dependents in households and their well-being has to take account of that. Thus a well-being perspective will need to examine intra-household distributional issues to examine the well-being of children (see Klasen, 2001, 2003, 2007). Such a perspective may well lead to situations where households have incomes above the poverty line but children may still suffer from inadequate access to resources.³¹ Second, a well-being perspective when applied to children must consider the intrinsic and instrumental relevance of childhood and youth. Children as human beings are endowed with the same right to be considered as 'ends' as anyone else; thus their well-being in terms of the capability approach should be intrinsically relevant. On the other hand, the opportunities and experiences of childhood and adolescence will critically shape their capabilities as adults; thus there is an important instrumental concern about child well-being (Klasen, 2001; 2003). In this context, education (both in the formal as well as in the informal sense as the skills one acquires) will be critical.

Based on the capability approach, the multidimensionality of poverty has been widely accepted and applied in the empirical analysis and measurement of well-being and poverty (see e.g. UNDP, 1990; World Bank, 2000; Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2002; Tsui,

³⁰ Such a capability or rights-based approach to human well-being or child development differs sharply from a utilitarian approach of maximizing wealth or consumption. For example, considering the Convention on the Rights of Children, article 29 about the goals of education illustrates this difference. Whereas an utilitarian approach to education would promote education that increase the sum of educational achievements and, therefore, target resources to those who are best able to use them, the rights-based approach calls for the maximization of the potential of each child, independently of whether this would lead to further growth and development (Klasen 2001).

³¹ Related arguments have been made regarding gender. Sen (1999) distinguishes also between female agency and female well-being. He argues that strengthening female agency (i.e. empowerment) will lead to an increased capability to achieve female well-being. See also Klasen (2007).

2001, Klasen, 2000).³² Many authors have emphasized the necessity of defining well-being and poverty as a multidimensional concept rather than relying on a single money-metric indicator. The explicit inclusion of non-monetary indicators and among the MDGs reflects that these indicators are fundamental dimensions of human well-being (Cornia et al., 2007).³³

Another advantage of the capability approach is that it allows researchers to employ techniques of analysis depending on the context of the underlying study. Sen (1976) proposes the measurement of poverty and well-being in two phases, namely identification and aggregation. In particular, the identification phase is concerned with the choice of the dimensions and respective indicators of well-being and with the choice of an analysis unit. Within the aggregation phase, the all information is aggregated into an index of poverty or well-being. While the capability approach by Sen provides the most solid framework for defining multidimensional human well-being and poverty, the question that remains unanswered in the capability approach is the choice of the capabilities to be included in an evaluation.³⁴ Many different dimensions of well-being have been identified depending on the place and situation, the level of analysis, and the information available. Well-being refers to being well, which means being able to live long, being well nourished, being healthy, and being literate, etc. Specific indicators, therefore, are life expectancy, child and infant mortality, access to health services, access to clean water and sanitation, literacy, years of schooling, and school enrollment ratios. While some indicators of well-being reflect the progress towards fundamental development goals, others can be seen primarily as intermediate indicators of well-being. For example, Narayan et al. (2000) identifies a set of basic capabilities of human well-being that is built of six main categories, material well-being, bodily well-being, social well-being, security, freedom of choice and action, and psychological well-being (Table 7).³⁵

³² The plurality of dimensions of human well-being was also one of the central focuses in the recent welfare literature that proposes a set of indicators describing the standard of living (see, e.g. Townsend, 1985). Most attempts are related to economic resources, education, health, social relations, and subjective deprivations.

³³ The most prominent composite indicators of human well-being are the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI).

³⁴ In addition, the question of the relative weights given to each component may be controversial (Sen 1992).

³⁵ Other attempts to categorize dimensions of well-being are, for example, proposed by Doyal and Gough (1991), Max-Neef (1993). Nussbaum (2000) identifies 12 basic functional capabilities, namely life, bodily health, senses, imaginations, thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species, play, material, control over one's environment. For a more detailed description and discussion of several attempts to define well-being and identify basic human needs, see Alkire (2002). Klasen (2002) constructs a deprivation index including variables for education, wealth, housing, sanitation, energy, employment, transport, financial services, nutrition, health care, safety, perceived well-being.

Table 7: Dimensions and Indicators of human well-being

Dimension of well-being	Indicator
Material well-being	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food • Assets • Work
Bodily well-being	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Being and appearing well • Health • Appearances • Physical environment
Social well-being	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Being able to care, bring up, marry and settle children • Self-respect and dignity • Peace, harmony, good relations in the family/community
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil peace • A physical safe and secure environment • Personal physical security • Lawfulness and access to justice • Security in old age • Confidence in future
Freedom of choice and action	
Psychological well-being	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace of mind • Happiness • Harmony (including religious observance)

Source: Narayan et al. (2000).

The second issue deals with the perspective to be taken when assessing human well-being. This refers on the one hand to the question whether well-being should be defined in ‘absolute’ or ‘relative’ terms, and on the other hand, whether from an ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ perspective. The international community often takes an absolute perspective for developing countries, where poverty lines are based on a minimum calorie intake, and a relative perspective for developed countries, where poverty lines are defined as a percentage of a mean or median income of a given population. For instance, the World Bank currently applies the one US\$ PPP per capita per day poverty line to developing countries whereas the EU defines the poor as people with an income below the poverty line of 60 percent of the median income in the respective country.³⁶

In recent years, the discussion and measurement of subjective measures of well-being has been growing. Many sociologists and anthropologists focus also on subjective well-being measures and on participatory poverty assessments (PPA), such as the economics of happiness (Veenhoven 2004). In such a subjective perspective, responses to questions about happiness and life satisfaction are taken as the basic building bloc of well-being assessment, linking subjective well-being to family status, health, social support, and

³⁶ In the multidimensional approach to measure well-being and poverty, one poverty line is defined for each attribute. Poverty lines used in multidimensional poverty analysis typically rely on the absolute approach to define poverty lines because most social indicators like life expectancy are better expressed in absolute terms (see, e.g. Chakravarty, 2002 and Tsui, 2002).

employment (Easterlin 1974, 2003). Inherent in the participatory approaches to measure human well-being is the assumption that participation will enhance human well-being both as ‘end’ in itself but also as a ‘means’ for a better representation of other dimensions of an individual’s well-being (White and Pettit 2004).

Related to this discussion of well-being and poverty, more recent developments emphasize also the social inclusion (or exclusion) as an alternative attempts to define well-being, focusing on the social process that hamper individuals from acquiring resources to meet their basic needs (see, e.g. Silver, 1994 and Cannan, 1997). Following the social inclusion approach, individuals can be excluded in three basis dimensions, economically, for example, through exclusion from the labor market in the formal sector, politically through, for example, a lack of participation in political activities, and culturally through, for example, through exclusion from benefits from social networks.³⁷ Focusing on the measurement of social exclusion in developed countries, Atkinson (1998) identifies three basis categories of social exclusion, namely relativity (i.e. exclusion relative to a specific social norm), agency (i.e. exclusion as a result from the actions of agents), and dynamics (i.e. future aspects are as relevant as the current situation).³⁸

A third issue when assessing human well-being is the time dimension, which has been neglected in the discourse on the definition and measurement of poverty and well-being for a long time. Time in well-being analysis can refer both static versus dynamic well-being measures as well as to ex-post versus ex-ante well-being analysis. Time or duration certainly is an important aspect for the understanding of individual’s current as well as lifetime well-being (Baulch and Hoddinott 2000). Whereas there is a long history of thinking of well-being over time at the macro-level (see, e.g. the World Development Reports), the study of micro-level poverty dynamics, i.e. the study of chronic versus transient poverty, had been largely neglected until the late 1990s, mostly due to data limitation. Furthermore, in recent years, the concept of well-being dynamics has moved from an ‘ex-post’ to an ‘ex-ante’ analysis, acknowledging that an individual’s current or past well-being might not be good indicator for his or her poverty risk, or in other words his her vulnerability to poverty (Calvo and Dercon 2005), which might not only influence the individual’s future well-being but also on his or her current well-being. This literature, however, is still in its infancy both from a conceptual as well as from a methodological perspective.³⁹

³⁷ For a more detailed discussion, see, for example, Strobel (1996), Atkinson (1998), and Evans (1998).

³⁸ See also Klasen (2001) for a discussion, and Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006) for a proposal for such a measure.

³⁹ A glaring shortcoming of static indicators of well-being is that they do not distinguish between those who are transiently poor or chronically poor. Especially in European countries, where policy interventions increasingly focusing on long term well-being (e.g. unemployment, pension systems), the time dimension has become increasingly important for the measurement of well-being. Children and the youth, those who

3.2 Measuring Well-being of Migrant Children and the Youth

Based on the right-based approach of well-being in the foregoing section, in this section we describe the framework to measure well-being of migrant children and migrant youth.

Several issues arise when assessing the wellbeing situation of migrant children. First, we need to distinguish how children and the youth are affected by migration. Second, we need to choose appropriate dimensions and indicators of well-being, bearing in mind the ‘intrinsic’ and ‘instrumental’ importance of childhood and youth that was just discussed. In this section, we follow Alkire (2007) who identifies several processes for the selection of dimensions of human well-being. In particular, we can choose the dimensions and indicators for the assessment of well-being of migrant children and migrant youth based on five general selection processes:

1. *Existing data of convention*: Dimensions or indicators can be chosen based on the availability of data or based on existing conventions concerning dimensions of well-being.
2. *Assumptions*: Selecting dimensions are based on normative assumptions about what people do value or should value. These assumptions can be based on social theories, religious or psychological view, or on conventions in the literature such as the list of capabilities by Narayan (2000), Nussbaum (2000), Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006), or Klasen (2000).
3. *Public ‘consensus’*: For example, dimensions of human well-being can be determined through some universally acceptable standards such as the human rights declaration and the MDGs.
4. *Ongoing deliberative participation*: The selection of the dimensions and indicators is based on actual people’s value based on group discussions and participatory analyses.
5. *Empirical evidence regarding people’s values*: The selection of dimension follows findings from existing socio-economic empirical analyses.

The main issue to address is the question what dimensions of well-being should be considered. In the case of studying the impact of migration on children and the youth, the choice of the dimensions heavily depends on the availability of data. However...

face discrimination, are most vulnerable for being chronically poor because their future economic and social position heavily depends on the current position of their parents.

It is difficult to select the dimensions of human well-being that are related to migrant children, because first, the relevant dimensions have to be chosen at the start of the analysis. Whereas Nussbaum (2000) argues there should be list of core capabilities Sen (1998) argues that capabilities should be selected in the light of the purpose of the study and be based on a process of public discussion in the society for which the assessment should be undertaken. While these are important debates, we would propose to be rather pragmatic here and focus on established indicators of capabilities used by authors such as Alkire (2002), Klasen (2000), and Narayan et al (2000).

Even if these disagreements can be settled, a number of critical questions arise when applying these well-being measurement concepts to migrant children. Let us raise these questions and then propose ways to move forward. Following from the discussion above, well-being issues will differ greatly if we talk about well-being directly associated with the process of migration. If this is our focus, procedural legal, economic, and social issues will be of particular importance. We may also want to focus (or at least also consider) those left behind and there is indeed some literature pointing to the important economic and social issues in this context (e.g. Hugo, 2002; Westin, 2002). Alternatively, we may want to mainly focus on the situation in the host country after migration has taken place. If we focus on the situation in the host country, we have to decide whether to focus just on first-generation immigrant children, or also on the next (or even third) generation.

While clearly the process of migration is critical and the impact on those left behind of great importance (as already discussed above), the focus here is to concentrate on the long-term well-being of migrant children in the host country. This is done for several reasons. First, the long-term well-being is, at least in the long-term, of greatest importance to migrants as well as their host societies. Second, our approaches to the measurement of well-being are particularly suited to captures these long-term aspects. Third, such an assessment will place the focus on the economic and social systems of host countries as the critical drivers of well-being of migrants.

An important further issue to consider is what is the relevant comparison group. As discussed above, voluntary migrants might compare their economic and social status to the situation in their country of origin; their children might also compare themselves with the native population (depending on the age of their migration). While from a subjective assessment the perceived reference group is important, for the analysis of migrant children (particularly those that same with their parents) the comparison with the native population

should be the relevant one. This is all the more the case, the most distant migration was, and certainly should be the case for second generation children.⁴⁰

In this context, another distinction between doing well and being well might be worth emphasizing. Migrant children and migrant youth face considerable difficulties of maintaining their sense of self-worth. The topic of self-esteem has particular relevance to the question of the subjective well-being of migrant children and migrant youth but also on the objective outcomes of well-being. For example, the achievement in education of migrant children and migrant youth may also be hampered by low self-esteem in a foreign and different society (see, e.g. Harter et al., 1998). A body of literature suggests that there exist, furthermore, a strong relation ship between self-esteem, school performance and parental care (see, e.g. Bankston and Zhou, 2002).

Lastly, it is important to consider that the well-being of children will depend greatly on the households they live in; something over which they tend to have little control. While attempts should be made to measure their individual well-being, often it is only possible to comment on the economic and social situation of the household. For example, analyses of child poverty typically measure the share of children that live in poor households (rather than examine the plight of the children directly, e.g. Smeeding et al. 2002); in other dimensions, it is possible to study the children directly.⁴¹

To summarize the discussion, child well-being (including agency) in the way conceptualized using the capability approach will be a multidimensional concept that will consider education, health, economic well-being, opportunities for social integration, and the ability to actively shape one’s life and surroundings. The particular indicators that could play a role are summarized in Table X below.

Table XX: Well-being Dimensions and Indicators of Migrant Children and Migrant Youth

Dimension	Indicator
Employment / Unemployment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equal opportunities (migrants-natives; women-man) • Employment status • Sector of Employment • Durations of unemployment • Subjective importance of work and job characteristics

⁴⁰ Of course, such comparisons should not be confused with ways to measure ‘assimilation’ of migrants in some social or cultural sense. These well-being comparisons should ideally compare economic and social opportunities and not measure a process of erasing difference.

⁴¹ For a related discussion of the well-being by gender, see Klasen, 2007.

Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to educational institutions • Level of education • Enrollment status • Educational outcomes • Investment in education (household)
Standard of Living	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Housing characteristics • Household structure (size, number of children) • Assets • Income/expenditure • Poverty • Subjective importance of income
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Health status (morbidity/mortality) • Subjective evaluation of health status • Access to health system • Health expenditures • Health prevention • Health knowledge
Social cohesion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social security coverage • Access to social services (insurances) • Discrimination • Social exclusion • Measures of social capital • Measures of integration
Safety and crime	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceptions of safety • Structure of victims • Victimization

Source: Illustration by the authors.

Well-being, in turn, is a function of the status of the child and the respective household, specific household socio-economic characteristics and the timing since migration, etc. To summarize the factors that need to be addressed when measuring the well-being of migrant children and migrant youth, we can express a basic equation for well-being written as:

$$\text{well-being of migrant children} = f(H, B, C, D \text{ etc})$$

H is a vector of human capital variables, including, for example, the age of the child, the age at immigration, its health endowments and health care access, its language skills, and its educational opportunities. B is a vector of demographic and economics characteristics such as gender, marital status of the parents, household size and household structure, household income, race and ethnicity, C can be a vector of the country of origin to capture country fixed effects and differences in the outcome depending at the country of origin; D can capture effects that are particular to particular immigrants groups (e.g. illegal labor migrants, asylum seekers, particular constraint and opportunities of certain ethnic background due to migration networks and/or discrimination and disadvantage, advantages and disadvantages associated with the migration process)

Another way to tackle the question of well-being of migrant children is to consider the particular risks they might face as a result of their migrant status. These are summarized in Table X

Table XX: Risk of children and youth affected by Migration

Left behind	Migrating with family	Migrating alone (whether forced or voluntarily)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Less parental care • Drug abuse • Lack of health • Lack of schooling • Teenage pregnancy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Psychological problems • Pressure to become labor migrant as part of transition to adulthood <p>When father migrates:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased responsibility for women and children • Female headed households face higher risk of poverty • Household vulnerability • Material and psychological insecurity <p>When mother migrates:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greater Risk of dropping out of school • Abuse of children 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack o educational opportunities • Lack of health • Teenage pregnancy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incomplete citizenship rights • Difficult access to social services • Reduced access to employment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social exclusion • Discrimination, victimization • Identity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intergenerational tension • • Barriers (language, culture, race) • Vulnerability • Poverty 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of schooling • Lack of health • Drug abuse • Teenage pregnancy • Crime commitment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Absence of adult protection <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk of trafficking and exploitation • Social ecclusion • Discrimination <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identiy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Psychological problems • Barriers (language, culture, race) • Lack of birth registration (stateless) • Increased risk of vulnerability • Increased risk of poverty

Source: Illustration by the authors.

3.3 Well-being of Migrant Children and the Youth in the EU

In this section we want to briefly discuss existing literature about dimensions of well-being of migrants and migrant children in the EU.

Economic integration and unemployment:

Models of integration suggest three different paths that children of migrants can take (Boyd 2002). First, the so-called ‘linear’ assimilation implies that typically after two of three generation in the destination countries, the socio-economic and socio-cultural different between migrants and native-born population diminish. Second, the so-called ‘segmented’ assimilation implies intergenerational socioeconomic improvements of migrants that are accompanied by a preservation of the ethnic and socio-cultural background. Third, there is also a possibility of socio-economic disadvantages, especially for groups that do not manage to decrease language and cultural barriers over time or facing other forms of social and economic exclusion. The path of assimilation depends not only on economic, social, political, and cultural factors but also on the process of adaptation immigrant households make towards their new environments across generations including the adoption of social norms, the accumulation of human capital investments (Borjas 2006). According to the theory of assimilation, the socio-economic

status of migrants in the host country is positively correlated with the length of the time since arriving and negatively correlated with the age at time of arrival (Kazemipur and Halli 2001). With longer stay in the destination country, immigrants manage to diminish language and cultural barriers, improve their educational and occupational skills, enter into or create social networks which results in a better socio-economic position. Matto et al. (2005) find large differences in the occupational attainment of migrants with similar educational level than native-born workers in the United States. Based on estimates using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), Adsera and Chiswick (2006) also show the differences in earning between migrants and native-born workers for 15 European countries. They show that the differences in earning decrease with the time since migration. Immigrants earning catch-up to those of the native workers after about 18 years of stay in the destination host country; but this is just an average hiding a great deal of heterogeneity between more successful and less successful migrant groups

The situation for migrant children differs from those of their parent. Their assimilation process already starts with their birth in the host country. Second generation migrants are assumed to catch-up even faster because they often do not face large language and cultural barriers as their parents had to struggle with. Very limited empirical evidence exists about the situation under which the second generation of migrants living in Western European countries. Structural barriers might lead to a segmented assimilation that is characterized by a downward mobility in terms of objective and subjective dimensions of human well-being.⁴²

Westin (2003) shows for Sweden that rates of unemployment are considerably higher for second-generation migrants than for native-born Swedish youth. Worbs (2003) presents similar results for Germany. The second generation of migrants in Germany, in particular the children of the former *guestworker* face a worse socio-economic position than the native-born German. From all ethnic groups among the second generation, children of Turkish migrants are the ones who are most disadvantaged. Ethnic disparities in education among the second generation of migrants are also found in the United States (Feliciano 2005).

Migration widens the opportunities to work. However, job restrictions cover many occupations in many Western European countries. Migrant youths tend to work only in distinct occupations. The most frequent jobs for young men are particularly involving heavy manual labor (e.g. construction or agriculture) and young women tend to work in the service sector (World Bank 2007). The kind of clustering of occupation of young migrant workers mainly stems from the relatively low entry barriers into these jobs and

⁴² Borjas (2006) find considerable empirical evidence for economic assimilation of the second generation of immigrants in the U.S.

little work experience and education. In addition, even migrants from developing countries with high levels of education have difficulties to find job in the field they are trained in, depending on the country of origin (Mattoo et al. 2005). For example, an educated person from India has a higher probability to find a job in the USA than a person from Mexico with a similar level of education.

Education:

In the long run, educational attainment is one of the most important means to obtain a more favorable occupation. Lower educational attainments among international migrants help to explain the concentration of migrant employees in certain job sectors and industrial branches. Given the differences in fertility between natives and immigrants and the increasing share of second generation immigrants among the youth population in European countries, a growing share of lower educated population has severe negative socioeconomic consequences (Mayer and Riphahn 2000).

For the analysis of the relationship between educational attainment and the well-being of migrant children, four issues need to be addressed: First, the level of education attainment and skills that migrant youth (if migrating independently) or the parents of migrant children and migrant youth have with them. Migrant children are often exposed to adverse family environments, when viewed in comparison to host country averages. In many European countries, migrant children are more likely to be born into or are living in poverty, more likely to grow up in single-parents homes and in homes in which the parents have low levels of education. These disadvantages are associated with poor childhood education often resulting in low levels of education in adulthood. Children from disadvantaged families are more likely to drop from school and are less likely to achieve tertiary education.

Second, whether migrant children and migrant youth can realize their skills. A persistent shortcoming is that most studies do not distinguish between the different generations of immigrants. However, several studies indicate the importance of immigrant generation as a factor of educational attainment and school performance (see, e.g. Kao and Tienda 1995). Usually, the second generation immigrants perform much better in schools than the first generation youth. For the first generation migrants this issue mainly refers to problems that language barriers or non-existing social networks makes it very difficult to obtain occupations with respect to their qualification. For the second generation migrants this issue refers more to the question of integration and social exclusion. For example, Frick and Wagner (2001) show for Germany that although there exist no formal discrimination of children with migration background by the German school system, low educational attainment is still partly transferred from one generation to the next

generation. In other words, children with migrational background are not able to 'catch up' their level of education to their native counterparts.

Third, it needs to be addressed whether international migrants experience intergenerational upward mobility in the level of educational attainment over time and which determinants influence this mobility. Numerous studies show that the educational attainment of the parents is the most important factor that explains the educational achievement of the second generation migrants (see, e.g. Neels and Stoop, 1999; Kalter and Kogan, 2002; Vanours and Veenmann, 2001). The educational level of children is strongly by their parents endowments. Besides the material status of the parents (see, e.g. Duncan et al., 1998), these endowments refer also to biological and cultural attributes and attitudes towards learning (Becker and Tomes 1995). Given their economic resources and their preferences, the parents make decisions towards the investment in their children with respect to education and health, but also about residential location and mobility, fertility and family structure (Pan 2007). Pan (2007) analyzes the relationship between legal status of international migrants in the U.S. and the scholastic achievement of their children. The study shows that there is a close relationship between the legal status of migrants and the educational attainment of their children. First, an illegal status hampers the access to well-paid legal occupation, which leads less economic resources to invest in the education of children. Second, unauthorized migrants live in ethnic enclaves, which make it more difficult for their children to overcome language barriers and social and cultural differences important for their school performance. Third, illegal status increases economic and geographically instabilities, because unauthorized migrants often have to change their job and locations. Additionally, also the type of the neighborhood in which the children grow up and existing residential influence the school performance of children (see, e.g. Rosenbaum, 1995; Rumberger and Larson, 1998).

On average, the second generation of migrants in Europe are better educated than their parents and also have better jobs. However, compared to the rest of the population, the second generation migrants (as well as other vulnerable minorities) are potentially disadvantaged in the education system for several reason resulting in an overall low educational level among international migrant children and migrants youth that the average population (see, e.g. Jonsson, 2002; Riphahn, 2003). Strong empirical evidence exists that show large differences in the educational attainments between migrant children and migrant youth and the native population in industrialized countries and also large heterogeneities regarding the extent of educational disadvantages among migrants (see, e.g. OECD, 2005; Mullis et al. 2004).

A recent paper by Schnepf (2006) examined the determinants of differences in educational achievements between migrants and the native population in ten OECD

countries⁴³ using PISA, TIMSS and PIRLS data. Apart from countries where the majority population speaks English, she found large differences in educational achievements between natives and migrants. The most important factors that influence the disadvantage are identified to be the language barriers, the length of the stay in the host country, the socioeconomic background and school segregation. The differences in the family socioeconomic background of children with a migrational background compared to the native population are of particular importance for differences in school performances in European countries (see also, for example, Gang and Zimmermann, 2000; Frick and Wagner, 2001). In countries like Switzerland or Germany where the second most children with a migration background stem from the former active recruitment programs high compositional and socioeconomic differences between these immigrants and native exist that contribute to the large differences in educational outcomes (see also, for example Castles and Miller, 2003; Entorf and Minoiu, 2005). In addition, another crucial factor for the educational integration of children and youth affected by migration is the pattern of their distribution across the schools in the host country. In particular, peer effects on educational outcome are shown to positively influence the educational outcomes of migrant children and youth (see, e.g. Hanushek et al. 2003). However, if the majority migrants pupils attend schools with, on average, lower school performance than schools where native pupil attend then migrant pupils are not able to take advantage from these peer group effects resulting in an overall lower school performance. Also Gang and Zimmermann (2000) compare the educational achievements of the second generation immigrants in Germany to those of the native population in the same age. Their also show that the second generation has made considerable improvements compared to the first generation immigrants but also that they lack behind the educational attainment of the native in the same age cohort.⁴⁴

Social exclusion:

Social exclusion has become one of the most important concepts in the debate of the well-being of migrant children and migrant youth in Europe. While there is a strong debate about how to define social exclusion (see, e.g. Atkinson, 1998, Evans et al., 1995, Klasen, 1998), Duffy (1995) emphasizes that social exclusion is concerned with the ‘inability to participate effectively in economic, social, and cultural life and, in some characteristics, alienation and distance from mainstream society’. It is important to distinguish social exclusion from poverty. While poverty is focused directly on households or individuals,

⁴³ In particular, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and, the USA.

⁴⁴ Similarly findings are shown by Chiswick and DebBurman (2003) for the second generation of U.S. immigrants. Besides large differences in educational attainment between immigrant generation they also show substantial heterogeneity between the educational attainment of immigrants depending on their country of origin.

social exclusion is concerned with the relationship and dynamics between the individual and the society she or he lives in. As social exclusion includes economic, social and political aspects of human well-being it is a multidimensional phenomenon. In addition, poverty may be both a cause as well as a consequence of social exclusion.

From a rights-based approach perspective Room (1995) defines social exclusion as the 'denial or non-realization of civil, political, and social rights of citizenship'.⁴⁵ Following Sen's capability approach, Klasen (2001) sees social exclusion as the 'failure of people to have access to critical capabilities relating to their integration into society'.⁴⁶ Klasen (2001) argues that applying the rights-based approach and the capability approach to the issue of social exclusion has several advantages. First, it takes into account that to participate in, and be respected by, mainstream society is a violation of a basic right. Therefore, it emphasizes the role of political, economic and social arrangements in generation exclusion and the role of solidarity among members of a society to overcome this exclusion (Townsend 1997). Second, seeing social exclusion from a rights-based and capability approach does not demand uniformity of outcomes, but instead calls for equal freedoms for all to enjoy aspects of citizenships. Therefore, there might be an important difference, for example, between economic and social discrimination of ethnic minorities as denial of some fundamental rights of participation, and diversity of cultural and social behaviors, where some groups choose to not participate in mainstream society arrangements despite they would have the option to do so. Whereas the former would be seen as a form of social exclusion, the latter would not. Third, it considers the diversity of people in their ability to make use of their opportunities.⁴⁷ For example, physically disabled might be seriously constrained in their ability to participate in mainstream society (due to mobility barriers), as it could also be the case for people who are disadvantaged by birth or background.

Applying the concept of social exclusion to measure the well-being of children necessitates further considerations. Children are citizenships who are entitled to rights and capabilities on their own right. Therefore, social exclusion is a problem of violating these

⁴⁵ Besides the rights-based approach to conceptualize social exclusion, there exist two other main approaches in the literature. The first, interprets social exclusion as the lack of participation in social institutions (see, e.g. Duffy, 1995; Paugamm and Russel, 2000). The second sees social exclusion in terms of a growing distance among population groups within a society (see, e.g. Akerlof, 1997).

⁴⁶ The Targeted Socio Economic Research Programme (TSER) of the European Commission describes social exclusion as the 'disintegration and fragmentation of social relation and hence a loss of social cohesion. For individual in particular groups, social exclusion represents a progressive process of marginalization leading to economic deprivation and various forms of social and cultural disadvantages'.

⁴⁷ It is very important to clarify here that the term 'rights' in the described rights-based approach does not necessarily refer to legally enforceable claims. Instead, these rights should be seen as a part of endowment of human beings. Whether societies are able to enable these basic rights to all of their citizens and depends on public consideration of the priority of these rights should enjoy over other rights, as well as the policy means available (Klasen 2001).

rights and capabilities directly, which is also recognized in the Convention of the Rights of the Children (UNICEF 1989). Failure to meet any of these fundamental rights could then be interpreted as evidence for social exclusion, since all these rights deal with the ability of the child to interact with the society in equal terms. At the same time, social exclusion affects the well-being also indirectly. Using the right-based and capability approach in defining social exclusion focuses both on the *intrinsic* problems related to social exclusion and on the *instrumental* reason why social exclusion may be a serious problem. If social exclusion violated basic human rights or capabilities, this implies that a society that tolerates social exclusion is intrinsically deficient as it fails to provide basic rights or capabilities to all its citizenship. The use of the Convention on the Rights of the Children, signed and ratified by 191 countries nicely illustrates this intrinsic importance. At the same time there are also several instrumental reasons why social exclusion might be problematic. First, since children are growing to be adults, and decisions, choices and opportunities during their childhood will crucially affect their position as adult, social exclusion, for example, in terms of access to education will have effects of future opportunities of children. Second, socially excluded groups might suffer from deficiencies in other important capabilities like the ability to be healthy, well-educated, well-nourished, or well-housed. This clearly reduces the well-being of those suffering from it, but can also have larger societal implication, for example, through health and education externalities. A large literature exists that show a strong relationships between social exclusion and such shortcomings (see. e.g. Walker, 1985, Klasen, 2000, Room, 1995). In addition, social exclusion may also have close empirical relations to other social problems such as crime, violence, social pathologies, racism, xenophobia, etc. Third, socially excluded children might become a social and economic burden to the society or even might generate considerable social disruptions. If social exclusion is transmitted intergenerationally, social exclusion might create even deeper divisions between groups within society that tighten across generations. Thus, combating social exclusion among children helps to combat social exclusion as adults. Forth, there may be even situation where one cannot speak of social exclusion among children, but nevertheless the particular situation in which some children find themselves might promote social exclusion among adults. For example, children might be legally well integrated into the educational system, but their special need, resulting in learning difficulties and other disadvantages, are not sufficiently taken into account.

Klasen (2002) classifies four main sources of social exclusion that can be linked to migrant children and migrant youth, economic, social, birth or background, and societal/political. Two economic disadvantages are of particular importance generating social exclusion. The first is related to unemployment, which hampers the access to income, value, and status that results in social exclusion associated with economic

vulnerability. The other disadvantage stems from the low incomes, which can lead to many forms of social exclusions. For children social exclusion generated by a low economic bases is associated with the low inability of their parents to afford increasingly costly items that are in fashion among children, including brand-name clothes, expensive hobbies etc. Social exclusion among migrant children and the youth, above all, is linked to social exclusion and economic opportunities among the household or family they live in. There is a large literature on the intergenerational transmission of poverty and on the relationship between poverty and exclusion among children linked to the economic and social situation of the parents (see, e.g. Hills, 1998; Machin, 1998; Mincy, 1994).

The most important social disadvantages that might foster social exclusion that might be of particular relevance for migrant children related to their families and neighborhood. Relating to their families, divorce, separation, and death of parents tend to be the most important factors that can promote social exclusion among children. There are also disadvantages of birth and background that might accelerate social exclusion among children. For example, the recognition of various forms of learning disabilities that have little physical bases but may be related to birth or social background is more uneven in many OECD countries. At the same time there may also be societal and political bases of social exclusion. Societal bases for social exclusion are mainly prejudice and discrimination of certain groups of the population. Here, issues can range from racial or ethnic bias in some OECD countries relating to housing, labor markets, and civil society institutions to outright hostility and violence against certain groups. Public policy induced social exclusion include, for example, restrictive citizenship policies for long-term foreign residents and restrictions in movements or economic activities of foreign residents (or asylum seekers).

Educational systems can be exclusionary in many ways. For example, schools draw most of their pupils from the local population and school resources are based on the local tax base. This means that for children living in a poor district, the exclusion associated with their poverty can be exacerbated by the educational system that underperforms in contrast to richer districts in the country. The USA is a typical example of such a situation.⁴⁸ In addition the ability to pay to higher quality private schools can generate considerable inequality in the educational opportunities for children.

The education system can also foster social exclusion in the way how it deals with the treatment of children with special needs. There exist significant differences in definition and treatment of these children in OECD countries. Children with learning difficulties are still very often in separate school systems. Since there is very little upward mobility from

⁴⁸ For the relationship between poor schooling outcomes and poor communities, see, e.g. Card and Krueger (1998) and Card and Payne (1998).

such school systems into regular education, this separation can become a form of social exclusion. In addition, in Germany, for example, children of foreign residents are heavily over-represented among students in schools for children with special needs, which create further barriers to their integration (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006).

Besides the impact of the social exclusion on migrant children and migrant youth themselves, childhood social exclusion has also larger negative social effects and on other aspects of well-being. For example, people who have suffered from social exclusion in education during their childhood are at high risk of becoming poor and unemployment in the long run. In addition, social exclusion during childhood is also associated with lower health outcomes, decreased access to housing and to food, and poorer access to healthcare systems, criminal behavior and to social cohesion in a country (Atkinson, 1998a; Mincy, 1994).

It is, however, very difficult to measure and monitor social exclusion among children and to compare levels of social exclusion between countries.⁴⁹ Since social exclusion is strongly linked to subjective connotations, just focusing on objective measures can not fully assess the extent of social exclusion. According to Klasen (2002) the assessment of social exclusion can be achieved from two different levels. The first is to measure the extent of social exclusion directly, and the second focuses on measuring the extent of the bases of social exclusion. Measuring social exclusion directly has the advantage that one does not need to rely on presumed (and often not tested) linkages between certain bases of social exclusion and the actual existing exclusion. Measuring social exclusion via the bases of social exclusion has the advantage that there may be more data available. Measuring social exclusion of migrant children and migrant youth directly could include, for example, the ability to participate in mainstream education, the ability to participate in social, leisure, and cultural activities, and the ability to enjoy the respect of one's peers. Based on this assessment, one could then develop indicators that show to what extent some children appear to be socially excluded in any of these ways. Possible indicators may then include objective and subjective items such as:

- Measures of dispersion of educational performance and their relation to background, neighborhood, economic means, or social policies (with particular emphasis on the poorly educated tail of the educational distribution)

⁴⁹ For example, Chakravarty and D'Ambrosio (2007) develop an axiomatic approach to measure social exclusion both at the individual and at a higher aggregate level. Bossert et al. (2004) links social exclusion to the concept of deprivation and develops also an axiomatic approach to measure social exclusion that is based on two major determinants of social exclusion, namely the lack of identification with other members of the society and the aggregate of alienation experienced by an agent with respect to those who have less functioning failures.

- Number/share of children excluded from normal educational system, number/share of children in special education systems
- Indicators of racial/ethnic/socio-economic mix in educational and social institutions (school, sport clubs, youth clubs, boy and girl scouts, etc.)
- Number/share of children not participating in leisure activities (sports, youth club, annual vacation with families) and indicators of segregation in such activities
- Number/share of children unable to afford costly youth culture activities (music, clothes, toys, etc.)
- Factors influencing school choice and educational streaming within schools
- Number/share of children involved in criminal activities or social pathologies (drugs, alcohol abuse, etc.)
- Number/share of children who feel excluded from certain aspects of youth culture (by causes, e.g. no money, no activity offered in neighborhood, not allow to join, etc.)

A study conducted by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC 2003) analyzes the situation of discrimination in employment of international migrants in the EU and indicates persistent exclusion, disadvantage and discrimination. The study shows that the labor market in the EU is highly segmented with respect to other national or ethnic groups. Migrants from developing countries are disproportionately employed in low-skilled and low-paid occupations showing only little upward mobility. Migrants from non-EU countries are mainly employed in industrial sectors (manufacturing) and sectors that are characterized by high seasonal fluctuations (agriculture). Migrant women are often restricted to the low-skilled service sector (domestic services, cleaning, health care). Overall, migrants from non-EU countries show larger rates of unemployment than the majority population.

Health:

Disparities in health between migrant children and native populations can be inherently linked to immigration. Migrants have changed environments with a specific set of health risks, systems, behaviors, and constraint into another set that might contain very different attributes. Hildebrandt (2004) studies the impact of migration from Mexico to the United States on child health using survey data from Mexico. She finds an overall positive impact of migration through an increased income that allows a better access to medical care, but also through improved health knowledge.

As before, two different issues arise: What is the impact of migration on health compared to non-migration and what is the health status compared to native-born in the host country?

The relationship between health and migration can be both positive and negative.⁵⁰ In a first place, international movement promotes the spread of diseases. However, migration may also promote health either through a better access to the health system or through remittances that rise income allowing a better access to essential treatments and drugs for those household members who were left behind. In addition, migration also promotes improvements in health indirectly through the spread of health knowledge and technology. A number other of health related issues arise with international migration and the youth. In the first place concerns are, for example, about the mental health of migrants, the lack of access to healthcare of migrant workers, and also the potential risk for the spread of diseases through migration. When considering the health status of migrant children after having settled, other issues arise that relate mainly to disparities in the most important determinants of good health, which includes adequate incomes, good access to health care and health insurance, good access to health knowledge, and access to and knowledge of healthy lifestyles.

Gender:

One of the most important issues in the context of international migration is the growing mobility of young women both in the context of family movement and alone. And there is a growing debate about a gender perspective in identifying and analyzing the effect of international migration on children and the youth. Migration can both increase the potential for greater equality and gender empowerment as well as increase female vulnerability. International migration can provide new opportunities for young women to improve their socio-economic status but also may expose women to new vulnerabilities.⁵¹

Family cohesion:

Acquiring cognitive and social skills is a dynamic process, which means that investment in children in different stages of their live affects the formation of different kinds of abilities. Heckmann (2000) suggests that longer-term socio-economic factors like parental care and

⁵⁰ This includes also mental health. On the hand the migration process might be very stressful resulting in negative effects on the mental health status of migrants (this is a particular problem in the case of forced migration). On the other hand, migration can improve mental health through e better overall subjective and objective standard of living compared to the situation of non-migrating (Stillmann, et al. (2003).

⁵¹ However, from a micro-level and social perspective the movement of a family member can have considerable impacts on the left behind, especially on the children of the household. Children who grow up without their father or, in the course of a rising feminization of migration, without their mother, receive less parental care (Care Drain).

family resources available to children over the life cycle are far more important for promoting readiness for higher level education and social attachment than family income during the relatively short period of adolescence. The impacts of factors operating in early childhood cumulate in later years of life in the form of improved cognitive and social skills, which explains inequalities in later socio-economic attainment.

Networks:

Networks play an important role in international migration. In particular, social networks have a strong impact on the size of the migration costs and risks (see, e.g. McKenzie and Rapoport, 2006). Family and friends abroad ease the process of migration.

Illegal migrants:

Due to the lack of micro data, there is only very limited empirical evidence about the well-being of unauthorized migrants. Existing literature is mainly focused in the earning and job mobility of illegal migrants (see, e.g. Borjas and Tienda, 1993; Philips and Massey, 1999; Kossoudiji and Cobb-Clark, 2002). Almost no empirical evidence exists about the intergenerational effect of migration status. An exception is the study by Dustmann (2007) who find for Germany that the probability of a permanent stay of the father (who had migrated illegally) positively affects the probability of the children attending school.

As this discussion shows, there is some literature available, but it lacks a comprehensive and consistent focus on the well-being of children. This is also partly related to data and measurement issues to which we now turn.

4. Measurement Issues

4.1 Analysis

After having decided what dimensions and indicators are included to measure the well-being of children and the youth affected by migration, several statistical and data issues have to be addressed. In measuring the multidimensional well-being of migrant children and migrant youth, we face a lot of similar measurement problems that are also found in the literature on traditional poverty measures.

One issue is the choice of dimension and the appropriate statistical aggregation techniques (e.g. multidimensional indices, factor or principal component analyses, dominance rankings, partial orderings, etc.). These are complicated, but in a sense,

standard issues of multidimensional poverty measurement that need to detain us here in greater detail.

A second issue particularly pertinent to migration analysis is the sample selection issue. Migrants are never a random sample of their sending country population. Depending on the question at hand, such selectivity would have to be taken into account. If we want to examine, for example, the economic success of the migration decision or the determinants of the migration decision, it is critical to consider the selectivity of the migrant pool, as done, for example, in Trübswetter et al. (2006). If however, our focus is on the long-term well-being of migrants in the host country, the selectivity issue becomes much less important. Now the focus becomes one of comparison of the actual group of migrants with the native population and it makes little sense to include in an assessment that this actual group is a non-random selection of the native population.

Pan (2007) point out two other statistical problems for the estimation of the intergenerational effects of the legal status of migrants to the educational attainment of their children. The first issue is related to a potential joint determination of legal status of migrants and the school performance of their children. For example, the migration status is determined by the education of the parents and better educated migrants are more likely to be legal migrants and since the educational level of the parents strongly influence the educational attainment of the children than a potential, on average, lower educational attainment of illegal migrants leads to an overestimation of the effect of the legal status of migrants on the educational outcome of their children. The second issue is related to existence of under- or misreporting of the legal status by illegal migrants, which can lead to a selection bias resulting in potential biased estimation results. These issues can be seen as general estimation problems to be overcome if one wants to analyze intergenerational well-being effects of migration.

4.2 Data Sources

In order to study the effects of international migration on children and youth and to formulate policy implications that enhance the well-being of children and youth affected by migration, there is a strong need for reliable and comparable data both at the micro-level and at the macro-level. Unlike traditional receiving countries like the USA, countries in Western Europe are sorely lacking of adequate data at the micro level with respect to international migration, particularly regarding the effects of international migration on well-being of children and youth. In many European countries not even reliable

aggregated data on migration is ease to get nor published periodically.⁵² Reasons for the persistent scarcity of data are the increasing mobility of people, which makes it more complicated to estimate stocks and flows of migration; the non-existence of a standardized way of how countries measure migration; and the increasing illegal migration that creates new measurement challenges (Whitehead and Hashim 2005).

In recent years more and more surveys have been conducted, both at the micro- and at the macro-level that provide interesting scope to analyze the effects of international migration on well-being. The Table A3 in the Appendix provides a summary of available data sets both at the micro level and macro level.

Comparable Data at the micro level:

An often discussed issue when analyzing the well-being of household and individuals is the question of whether using quantitative or qualitative data on well-being. However, many of the latest available household survey data for European countries include, besides objective information about the socio-economic well-being of households and person, also a module on subjective well-being and life satisfaction, which allows analyzing subjective and objective well-being simultaneously.

At the micro-level there exist, in general, household survey data that includes information on socio-economic characteristics by migration background that can be categorized by the type of survey, namely cross-section data versus panel data, and by internationally comparable data and nationally conducted household survey data (country case studies). A prominent example of a national panel survey data set is the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) which includes substantial information on social-economic characteristics, income, education, health, and employment. In addition, the GSEOP includes also a module of subjective well-being, i.e. how the individual is actually satisfied with his or her life situation (including a question about disadvantages because of the respondent's origin). Concerning migration status the GSEOP provides comprehensive information such as the native language, information about the family the respondent grew up, citizenship, nationality, and whether the respondents was born in Germany. However, since we are interested in analyzing the well-being of migrant children and migrant youth across European Countries, we are more interested in data sources that are available for several European countries and not focused on surveys that are only available at the national level, because such data sources are typically not comparable across countries since they do not include standardized assessment of social and economic attributes of households and individuals.

⁵² In contrast, in Australia, Canada and USA, routinely distributed databases on the characteristics of arriving immigrants constitute to the main statistical data source used for research on international migration.

There exists some comparable cross-sectional household survey data that allows an assessment of the well-being of children and youth by their migrational status like, for example the *Demographic and Health Surveys* (DHS) for developing countries, the *Labor Migration Survey* and the *Child Labor Surveys* by the ILO, the *Luxembourg Income Study* (ILS) and the *Luxembourg Wealth Study* (LWS), and the *Living Standard Measurement Surveys* (LSMS) that are available for several European and OECD countries. The strength of these data sets is the standardized data collection and the rich information on migration regarding the dimension of well-being these data sets have their focus on. However, although these data sets are available for quite large sample of countries the main weakness is that there are not panel data sets and, therefore, do not allow an assessment of well-being of international migrants over time. Since we are interested in both, the differences in well-being of migrant children and migrant youth compared to their native counterparts and also compared to their parents, i.e. the well-being of the second generation of migrants, panel data are clearly preferred to analyze these differences over time.

The currently most promising international comparable panel survey to analyze the well-being of migrant children and youth in the EU is the *European Community Household Panel* (ECHP). The survey is based on a standardized questionnaire that is conducted annually for all European countries from 1994 to 2001. It covers multidimensional information on household's and person's well-being. Besides substantial information about the income situation of interviewed households, the study includes also socio-economic characteristics such as social relations and responsibilities, health, education, pensions, and subjective life satisfaction. The main advantage of the ECHP is its standardized methodology yielding comparable information across countries and over time. The ECHP provides also a migration module allowing a migration trajectory and including information such as, for example, the year of arrival, country of birth, citizenship. Similarly to the ECHP, the *EU Statistics on Income and Living Condition* (EU-SILC) also includes various modules concerning different dimensions of human well-being at the household level such as characteristics of housing, employment, health, and education.

However, the major shortcoming of these surveys is that their focus lies on adults (aged over 16) and not on children. Although these studies include some information on the well-being of children, the information stem from the interviewed adults. In contrast to this typical survey design, the *Young Lives Project*, an international in-depth study of childhood poverty, has its main focus on the well-being of children and with the aim to track chances of outcomes and impacts of poverty of children. The data provide substantial information on indicators of childhood poverty including several dimensions of

well-being. Besides family attributes and information about the physical environment, the study also provided information on education, health, nutritional status and social capital. The Young Lives Project provides a lot of scope for analyzing the well-being of migrant children, since it includes information of the migrational status of the mother, particular, whether she was born outside the US or whether she was born in a developing country. However, the study is so far limited to four developed countries, namely Ethiopia, India, Peru, and Vietnam. But the Young Lives Project can be seen as a useful starting point that could be augmented to European Countries, which would provide very interesting new insights and information of actual childhood poverty in general, and well-being of migrant children and youth in particular.

There exists also comparable data at the micro-level that allows analyzing the well-being of migrants in the EU in particular dimension. For example, the availability of data sources on educational attainment has been improved. Internationally comparable data such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), Progress in International Reading and Literacy Study (PIRLS), and the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) provide information on educational outcome such as ability or functional literacy and also comparable information on the migrant status, which has increased to opportunities to analyze differences in educational outcome between migrant children and youth and native pupils. The main advantage of these data sources is that they are based on standardized assessments, which allows an international comparison of the educational outcomes of children and by migration status allowing also the analysis of the differences between native children and youth and children and youth with migration background. For example, the PISA survey started in the year 2000 followed by the year 2003 and 2006 and was implemented for more than 40 countries including between 4500 and 10000 students in each country. Another advantage of the studies is that they implicitly include also information of the quality of education within countries.

There are hardly any comparable micro data on health or social integration or other well-being aspects discussed above. Here all one can rely on is what is included in the household surveys and hope that these dimensions of well-being are reasonably covered. The alternative is to take recourse to smaller, non-comparable specialized studies or surveys. Some are listed in the appendix tables.

Comparable Data at the macro level:

According to the United Nations (1998) data sources providing information on international migration can be grouped into four types: (1) administrative registers including population registers and registers of foreigners; (2) other administrative sources

like issuance visa, residence permits, work permits and exit clearances; (3) border statistics; (4) household-based data including population censuses and household surveys of different types.

At the macro level, substantial aggregated data exists on the number of international migration in the EU. In general, there exist two main kinds of data on international migration for European countries, namely data on stocks or on flows of migrants. Stocks of foreigners are defined either by nationality or by country of birth and recorded through a system of residence permits, populations registers, censuses or surveys. Stocks of foreign workers are measured through work permits and labor force surveys (Salt 2005). Data on flows of migrants are much more difficult to measure and data for EU members mainly stem from joining or leaving a population register or residence permits. Both with data on annual flows of migrants as well as with data on total immigrants stocks, differences in the national views of who is considered as a 'migrant' that limits the comparability of data across countries.⁵³ Whereas in some countries immigrants are considered as persons who are 'foreign-born', other countries consider immigrants as persons of 'foreign nationality'. Because foreign-born persons can acquire the nationality of a country statistics on foreign population may differ from statistics on the foreign-born population. Therefore, for many European countries, the number of the foreign-born population exceeds the number of those with foreign nationalities (see, e.g. Münz 2004).

Since 1995, UNECE and Eurostat use a joint questionnaire to collect statistics from European countries and since 1999 this collaboration was extended to the Council of Europe and some CIS countries. However, besides these developments to establish a harmonized system of data collection on international migration across Europe, there are still considerable gaps in data availability for countries for Central and Eastern Europe. For some countries no collection systems exist or countries are not willing to provide statistics (Salt 2005). A recently conducted review conducted by the IOM (IOM 2002) shows that the statistical data availability for the CIS countries is still limited and of uneven quality. The development towards a common system of data collection varies widely across countries. Whereas some countries have made much effort to establish a harmonized data collection system, in some other countries, especially those countries that have suffered from civil war or social conflicts, progress is very low.

The 2000 OECD censuses for almost all OECD countries include a question of the country of birth of persons enumerated, as well as on their nationality⁵⁴. This new database is the first internationally comparable data set with detailed information on the foreign-born population. The database provides the possibility of a detailed, comparable

⁵³ For a detailed overview of this particular problem, see also Pearson et al. (2005).

⁵⁴ In particular, the database covers 227 countries of origin and 29 receiving countries within the OECD.

and reliable analysis of the immigrant population living in OECD countries. In addition, the incorporated information on the educational attainment of migrants, allows assessing the impact of movements on the flow of human capital for these countries Dumont and Lemaitre (2005). In addition, Eurostat provides annually information on education, social well-being and other socio-economic characteristics for migrants for all European countries.

In short, data availability issues remain highly problematic to systematically assess the well-being of migrant children. What is needed at the micro level is at least the extension of existing comparable panel data sets to include systematic information on the well-being of children in its multiple dimensions. In addition, more specialized surveys are probably required to deal with more complex issues such as health, economic and social integration, and trajectories of migrant children.

At the macro level, the most important data issue is to generate comparable data on migrant flows and stocks, including second and third generation migrants, using consistent definitions and data sources. This remains an area of urgent attention. In addition, it would be useful to be able to distinguish these flows and stocks by the type of migration to get the basic stylized facts of the migration experience.

5. Concluding Remarks

This survey has first shown that migration issues are critical areas of economic and social research in European countries. Migrant stocks and flows are rising and the future economic and social development of Europe will greatly depend on the ability of migrant groups to be able to actively participate and promote economic development in their host countries. Much of this will depend on how migrant children are faring within Europe, which is also a rising and critical question from a well-being perspective.

We have also pointed out that there has not been a comprehensive assessment of the well-being of migrant children in Europe. This is partly due to the complexity of the task, esp. given the heterogeneity of the migration populations, partly is an area neglected as immigration has only recently been acknowledged as a permanent feature of European societies. Also, the data and analytical concepts for such analyses are largely lacking.

We propose that therefore there is much scope to develop a research agenda that would focus on the well-being of migrant children in Europe. Elements of such a research agenda should include (at least):

- Research into a conceptual framework for analyzing the well-being of children. Much of the well-being literature is largely focused on adults individuals and needs to be extended to consider children and their special position as citizens and persons still undergoing a process of formation; The basic framework could (and probably should be) the capability approach that would then need to be extended.
- Research into defining the most important dimensions of well-being, as they particularly pertain to migrant children. Of particular importance would be approaches that explicitly take account of the heterogeneity of the migrant experience and that would also distinguish between well-being dimensions associated with the process of migration, short-term as well as long-term effects of the migration experience in host countries.
- The compilation of databases that can be used to analyze the experience of migrant children in European countries. A start is made in this paper which should be extended, particularly by including more specialized surveys that cover particular dimensions of well-being.
- The systematic analysis of existing databases and surveys to study the experience of migration children from a well-being perspective. Many surveys exist but have not systematically been used to analyze this issue. In fact, much of the migration literature has been focused on education and

labor market performance. Much more can be done using the same data to study well-being using a wider perspective.

- The extension of existing survey instruments (particularly panel household surveys) by including questions about the well-being of children in general (and migrant children in particular).
- The systematic development of comparable macro data on migrant stocks and flows in Europe using consistent definition and differentiating by types of migration.

Thus there is much work to be done and we hope that some of these research issues will be tackled in future research programs.

Appendix: Tables and Figures

Table A1: International migrants as a percentage of the population for selected European countries

	International migrants as a percentage of the population				Female migrants as a percentage of all migrants			
	1990	1995	2000	2005	1990	1995	2000	2005
Europe	6.9	7.6	8	8.8	52.8	52.7	53.4	53.4
Western Europe								
Austria	6.1	8.9	11.4	15.1	51.9	51.9	51.9	51.9
Belgium	9	9	8.5	6.9	46.1	47	48.2	49.1
Denmark	4.3	4.8	5.7	7.2	50.8	50.8	50.8	50.8
Finnland	1.2	2	2.6	3	49.9	49.6	50.4	51
France	10.4	10.5	10.6	10.7	49.1	49.9	50.7	51.6
Germany	7.5	11.1	11.9	12.3	44.5	44.8	46.7	48.3
Greece	4.1	5.1	6.7	8.8	51.4	52.8	54.2	55.6
Iceland	3.5	3.9	5.6	7.8	55.7	55.9	54.9	53.8
Ireland	6.5	7.3	10.1	14.1	50.3	50.2	50.1	50
Italy	2.4	2.6	2.8	4.3	56.4	56.2	56	55.8
Luxembourg	30.2	33.4	36.9	37.4	49.7	49.8	50	50.1
Netherlands	8	9	9.8	10.1	50	54.4	54.4	54.4
Norway	4.4	5.3	6.6	7.4	48.6	49.6	50.2	50.9
Portugal	4.4	5.3	6.2	7.3	52.2	52.1	52.1	52
Spain	1.9	2.5	4	11.1	51.6	51.4	50.3	47.4
Sweden	9.1	10.3	11.2	12.4	51.5	51.7	52.1	52.1
Switzerland	20.1	21	21.8	22.9	49.7	49.7	49.7	49.7
Turkey	2	1.9	1.8	1.8	50.5	51.2	51.9	52.6
United Kingdom	6.6	7.3	8.1	9.1	51.9	52.7	53.5	54.3
Central and Eastern Europe								
Bulgaria	0.2	0.6	1.3	1.3	57.9	57.9	57.9	57.9
Czech Republic	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.4	55.5	54.9	54.3	53.8
Estonia	24.1	21.3	18.3	15.2	55.1	57.3	59.6	59.6
Hungary	3.4	2.8	2.9	3.1	52.4	52.4	52.4	52.4
Latvia	29.7	28.5	22.7	19.5	56.4	56.9	57.6	57.8
Lithuania	9.4	7.5	6.1	4.8	56.6	56.6	56.6	56.6
Poland	3	2.5	2.1	1.8	57.2	58.1	59	59.9
Romania	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	56.5	55.1	52.8	50.7
Russian Federation	7.8	7.9	8.1	8.4	56.4	56.9	57.6	57.8
Slovakia	0.8	2.1	2.2	2.3	0.8	2.1	2.2	2.3
Slovenia	9.2	10.2	8.9	8.5	50	48.5	47	45.6

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision.

Table A2: Stocks and Proportion of foreign born population by region for selected European countries (2000-2001)

	Africa		Asia		Latin America, Caribbean		North America		EU25		Other Europe		Unknown		Total
	Stock	Percent	Stock	Percent	Stock	Percent	Stock	Percent	Stock	Percent	Stock	Percent	Stock	Percent	
Austria	19934	2.0	57236	5.7	6054	0.6	10960	1.1	364624	36.4	527007	52.6	16717	1.7	1002532
Belgium	247515	22.5	68494	6.2	20387	1.9	23515	2.1	621471	56.5	117787	10.7	12	0.0	1099181
Denmark	31875	8.8	110454	30.6	9208	2.6	14157	3.9	118004	32.7	77355	21.4		0.0	361053
Finland	9713	7.4	18375	14.0	1817	1.4	5097	3.9	51681	39.3	44764	34.1	1	0.0	131448
France	2862569	48.8	444774	7.6	79987	1.4	89445	1.5	1978923	33.7	412539	7.0	5	0.0	5868242
Germany	175665	1.7	567021	5.5	47578	0.5	81308	0.8	2552578	24.9	5244548	51.1	1587387	15.5	10256085
Greece	58275	5.2	75854	6.8	5486	0.5	57922	5.2	191038	17.0	733183	65.3	882	0.1	1122640
Ireland	26650	6.7	27768	6.9	2793	0.7	34718	8.7	291340	72.8	16408	4.1	339	0.1	400016
Luxembourg	5692	4.0	4382	3.1	1562	1.1	1806	1.3	116309	81.5	11855	8.3	1046	0.7	142652
Netherlands	280007	17.3	367987	22.8	221626	13.7	136378	8.4	340220	21.1	269158	16.7	1	0.0	1615377
Norway	31278	9.4	100274	30.0	15133	4.5	19774	5.9	116637	34.9	49868	14.9	805	0.2	333769
Poland	2962	0.4	9479	1.2	920	0.1	11439	1.5	248868	32.1	483223	62.3	18391	2.4	775282
Spain	423082	19.5	86669	4.0	744221	34.3	125563	5.8	597948	27.5	194676	9.0	42	0.0	2172201
Sweden	78039	7.2	244246	22.7	59965	5.6	23843	2.2	456262	42.3	215241	20.0		0.0	1077596
Switzerland	68801	4.4	101599	6.5	48327	3.1	42940	2.7	854305	54.4	352962	22.5	101822	6.5	1570756
Turkey	12686	1.0	83657	6.6	1010	0.1	18487	1.5	447739	35.6	695795	55.2	1	0.0	1259375
United Kingdom	828459	17.1	1579133	32.5	95357	2.0	641261	13.2	1493235	30.8	175577	3.6	42541	0.9	4855563
Czech Republic	2374	0.5	21365	4.8	870	0.2	3623	0.8	344256	76.8	75989	16.9		0.0	448477
Hungary	2687	0.9	10730	3.7	773	0.3	3864	1.3	65057	22.2	209815	71.6	5	0.0	292931
Slovakia	404	0.3	1400	1.2	154	0.1	1086	0.9	99931	83.9	16097	13.5		0.0	119072

Source: Calculation by the OECD based on national censuses; Dumont and Lemaitre (2004).

Table A3: Summary of internationally comparable data sources


Data Source	Summary description	Access	Panel/Cross-Country	Year(s)	Information in child migration	Information on child well-being
MICRO LEVEL						
European Labour Force Survey (EU LFS)	The European Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) is the main data source for the domain 'employment and unemployment' in the European databases. The contents of this domain include tables on population, employment, working time, permanency of the job, employees etc. The data is commonly broken down by age, sex, education level, economic activity and occupation where applicable. The European Union Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) is conducted in the 25 Member States of the European Union and 3 countries of the EFTA.	Via application at Eurostat or special variable evaluation from www.edsdstatis.de	Cross-section	1983-2005 (annually)	Country of birth, Nationality, Years of residence in member state	Education, income, children by age, employment, employment status, occupation, and job characteristics
Young Lives Project	The Young Lives Project is an international in-depth study of childhood poverty and has its main focus on the well-being of children with the aim to track chances of outcomes and impacts of poverty. The data provide substantial information on indicators of childhood poverty including several dimensions of well-being. Besides family attributes and information about the physical environment, the study also provided information on education, health, nutritional status and social capital.	Young Lives Round 1 available on web	Panel Countries: Ethiopia, India, Peru, Vietnam	1st Round 2002, 2nd Round 2006/07	Migration mother and child last 12 months	Child characteristics, health, nutrition, assets, social capital,
European Community Household Panel (ECHP)	The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a panel survey in which a sample of households and persons has been interviewed year after year. These interviews cover a wide range of topics concerning living conditions. They include detailed income information, financial situation in a wider sense, working life, housing situation, social relations, health and biographical information of the interviewed.	Application at Eurostat	Panel	1994-2001 (8 waves)	Migration (trajectory, year of arrival in region, last residence, country of birth, citizenship, second citizenship)	Household and child demographic characteristics, income, assets, payments for children, source of income of children under 16, education, health social relations, satisfaction.
German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP)	The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) offers microdata for research in the social and economic sciences. The data include information on many objective living conditions, values, willingness to take risks, and about the dynamic relationships currently being undergone in these areas of life their changes. The data is used not only for basic academic research but also for policy-related social reports directed at a broader audience. SOEP data make it possible to test a wide range of economic and social theories as well as psychological theories. SOEP places great value on integrating users' input for improvements and theory-based extensions to the survey.	Available on request	Panel	Panel started in 1984	Foreigners: the largest regular survey of foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany, including households whose head is Turkish, Spanish, Italian, Greek or former Yugoslavian; Immigrants: the only methodologically high-quality survey of immigrants who entered West Germany after 1984. (Immigrant sample)	Youth Questionnaire: income, education, friends, relationships, freetime, sport MPHTER AND CHILD Questoinnaire (0-18 months); Child Health, happiness of mother with child

Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS)	The LSMS was designed as a multi-faceted program to: (a) improve the quality of household survey data; (b) increase the capacity of statistical institutes to perform household surveys; (c) improve the ability of statistical institutes to analyze household survey data for policy needs; and (d) provide policy makers with data that can be used to understand the determinants of observed social and economic outcomes.	On web or request through LSMS office	Cross-country (various industrialized and developed countries)	Since 1985 (various countries with cross-section data)	Migration (place of birth, property of displaced person, reason for migration, relatives in new area, past residence, residential moving)	Consumption, income, health, education
World Happiness Database	The World Database of Happiness is an ongoing register of scientific research on the subjective enjoyment of life. It brings together findings that are scattered throughout many studies and provides a basis for synthetic work.	Available on request	Cross-section	Various years		Subjective well-being
EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (Silc)	The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) is an instrument aiming at collecting timely and comparable cross-sectional and longitudinal multidimensional micro-data on income, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions. This instrument is anchored in the European Statistical System	Official access request at Eurostat	Cross-section and panel	2004	Country of birth, migration in/out hh in questionnaire wave	Child care, assets , income, employment, health, education
Child Labour Surveys (ILO)	The ILO's International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) was created in 1992 with the overall goal of the progressive elimination of child labour, which was to be achieved through strengthening the capacity of countries to deal with the problem and promoting a worldwide movement to combat child labour.	Data available on ILO Website	Cross-section	Since 1992 (various developing countries in various years)	Place of birth	Household characteristics (size, structure, income) employment
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)	The Luxembourg Income Study - is a non-profit cooperative research project with a membership that includes 30 countries on four continents: Europe, America, Asia and Oceania. The LIS project began in 1983 under the joint sponsorship of the government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Centre for Population, Poverty and Policy Studies (CEPS).	Data available on web	Cross-section	1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2004), varies for countries and years	Demographic variables: Immigration Status	Assets, income , expenditure, demographic information of household head and spouse.
Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS)	On 6 December 2007, the Luxembourg Income Study released for public use the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS), a new database containing harmonized wealth microdata. The LWS database was modelled after its "sister database", the Luxembourg Income Study, our 24-year-old database that contains harmonized income datasets.	Available on web: http://www.lisproject.org/lwstechdoc.htm	Cross-section	Various Years	Immigration Status of household head and spouse	Demographic, labour, wealth (assets),expenditure, income, behavioral variables (saving, happiness,...)
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)	The DHS are nationally representative population-based surveys with large sample sizes (usually between 5,000 and 30,000 households). In all households, women age 15-49 are eligible to participate; in many surveys men age 15-54(59) from a sub-sample are also eligible to participate. There are core questionnaires in DHS surveys: A Household Questionnaire, a Women's Questionnaire, and a Male questionnaire.	On request at DHS homepage	Cross-section	Various years		Assets, household socio-economic characteristics, education, health, nutrition

World Value Surveys	The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural and political change. It is conducted by a network of social scientist at leading universities all around world.	free access on web:	Cross-section	1990, 1995, 2000, 2005		Trust, happiness, satisfaction, priority towards children (subjective well-beeing)
Health Behaviour in school-aged children (HBSC)	Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) is a cross-national research study conducted in collaboration with the WHO Regional Office for Europe. The study aims to gain new insight into, and increase our understanding of young people's health and well-being, health behaviours and their social context.	Request at: www.hb-sc.org	Cross-section	1983/84, 85/86, 89/90, 93/94, 97/98, 2001/02, 2005/06		Health, own bedroom, vacation, assests
ILO Labor Migration Survey	In 2004, the International Labour Conference of the ILO adopted a Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration which is part of a plan of action for migrant workers agreed by ILO constituents. The Framework is part of an ILO plan of action which aims at better managing labour migration so that it contributes positively to the growth and development of both home and host societies, as well as to the well being of the migrants themselves.		Cross-section	2003	Migration by sex, citizenship, inflow/outflow	

Data Source	Summary description		Panel/Cross-Country	Year(s)	Information in child migration	Information on child well-being
MACRO LEVEL						
UN World Population Prospects	Official UN population estimates (1950-2050), survey and projections for the world, 6 major areas, 21 regions and 228 countries or areas. Estimates and projections are also given for more developed regions, less developed regions, least developed regions and sub-Saharan Africa		Cross-section	20 rounds since 1950	Net-migration (stocks and flows of migration)	
Programme for International Student Assessment" (PISA)	PISA is part of the "Indicators of Educational Systems" (INES) of the OECD. The study is an internationally standardized assessment. The survey was implemented in the year 200, 2003, and 2006 for more than 40 countries including between 4500 and 1000 students for each country.		Panel (2000, 2003, 2006)	1998-2001; 2000-2004; 2003-2007	Migrational background	Reading, mathematics, science education
Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS)	PIRLS 2006 is the second in a cycle of internationally comparative reading assessments carried out every five years. Conducted at the fourth grade, this world-wide assessment and research project is designed to measure trends in children's reading literacy achievement and collect information about policy and practices related to read and reading instructions. PIRLS 2006 provides information on the impact of the home environment on reading achievement and how parents can foster reading literacy.		Cross-section	2001, 2006	Migrational background	Reading, comprehension
Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)	TIMSS 2007 is the fourth in a cycle of internationally comparative assessments dedicated to improving teaching and learning in mathematics and science for students around the world. TIMSS provides data about trends in mathematics and science achievement over time. To inform educational policy in the participating countries, this world-wide assessment and research project also routinely collects extensive background information that addresses concerns about the quantity, quality, and content of instruction. For example, TIMSS 2007 will continue collecting detailed information about mathematics and science curriculum coverage and implementation, as well as teacher preparation, resource availability, and the use of technology.	for 2007 coming May 2009, 2003 available on web	Cross-section	1995, 1999, 2003, 2007		Mathematics and science knowledge
EUROSTAT	Official online database of the European Commission	available on www.eurostat.com	Cross-section	Annually	Migration, place of birth	Education, social well-being, socioeconomic characteristics

Figure A1: Old age dependency ratio (%) for the EU



Notes: EU 15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. EU 25: + Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.

Source: Eurostat.

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